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THE DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLAN SYSTEM: FINANCIAL 






The defined benefit (DB) pension system that provides retirement security to 44.5 
million Americans faces significant challenges.  At the end of 2003, the system was 
underfunded by $350 billion, there were 82,696 fewer plans then during the system peak 
(in 1985), and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) responsible for 
ensuring retirees receive their retirement benefits even after a plan terminates, reported a 
deficit of $11.49 billion.  This thesis examines the challenges facing the DB pension plan 
system, beginning with an overview of the DB plan system, a review of the different plan 
types, the benefits received, and funding rules.  Next, examining the PBGC, its purpose, 
its organization, and the role that it plays in the DB pension system.  Followed by an 
identification of the challenges facing the pension plan system, and corporate America's 
frustrations with the system.  Finally, the thesis presents some recent reform proposals, 
and provides corporate America's response to them.  A changing workforce demanding 
leaner retirement options, plans that allow multiple career changes, provide beneficiaries 
with lump sum benefits, provide early vesting characteristics, and are easily understood, 
is challenging the future of the DB plan system.  To survive the DB plan system must 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. OVERVIEW 
Approximately 75 percent of Fortune 500 companies offer Defined Benefit (DB) 
Pension plans to their employees and more than 35 million Americans rely on such 
pensions.1  However, America’s corporate DB system was under-funded by $350 billion 
in 2003.2  When a large company such as Bethlehem Steel (95,000 plan participants) 
fails, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a federally funded corporation, 
assumes responsibility for the company’s DB plans, and takes control of its assets, in 
order to ensure that retirees receive the guaranteed portion of their earned benefits.  In the 
case of Bethlehem Steel, the PBGC assumed a $3.6 billion liability.3  Failures such as 
this, and nearly 300 others in the last two years, have caused the PBGC to incur an 
accumulated deficit of approximately $11.49 billion.4   
The PBGC receives no funding from general tax revenues.  Rather, it is financed 
by insurance premiums, investment income, DB plan assets and recoveries from 
companies formerly responsible for DB plans.  If the current trend continues, the PBGC 
could exhaust its $35 billion in assets, and the responsibility for funding failed corporate 
DB plans will ultimately fall on the taxpayer.  Congress recently passed the Pension 
Funding Equity Act of 2004, legislation providing among other things, an extension of a 
temporary interest rate (expiring in 2006), allowing firms to use conservative high-grade 
corporate bond rates instead of the 30-year Treasury rate when calculating plan 
liabilities.5  The legislation also reduced approximately 80 percent of the required deficit 
                                                 
1 Committee on Investment of Employee Benefit Assets.  (2004, March).  The U.S. Pension Crisis: 
Evaluation and Analysis of Emerging Defined Benefit Pension Issues.  Retrieved March 30, 2004, from 
www.AFPonline.org,  9. 
2 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (2004).  2003 Annual Report.  Retrieved March 30, 2004, 
from http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/annrpt/default.htm.  1. 
3 Ibid.,  2. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, H.R. 3108 Conference Report, 108th Cong., (2004, April 1).  
Retrieved March 24, 2004, from  
http://edworkforce.hoU.S.e.gov/issues/108th/workforce/pension/pension.htm.   Section 101.a. 
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reduction contribution (DRC) payments for a limited number of firms facing an increased 
threat of plan termination since 2000.6   
Some speculate that the “perfect storm” of 2000-2002 (poor stock market 
performance, historically low interest rates and a stagnant economy), resulted in nearly 
300 DB plan terminations in the last two years.  Whatever the cause, several agencies 
within the federal government (Treasury Department/Department of Labor 
(DOL)/PBGC) as well as the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have 
simultaneously proposed solutions to strengthen the DB pension plan system and reduce 
the number of annually terminated plans, thus alleviating the PBGC of a growing 
financial burden.  This thesis will evaluate the current DB plan system, the problems it 
has encountered in the recent past, and some of the proposed solutions. 
 
B. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This thesis will include analysis of: (1) the DB plan system; (2) the purpose, 
function and current status of the PBGC; (3) current challenges facing the private DB 
pension system, including demographic shifts affecting the system, the views of 
corporate America, the problems stemming from costly and complex accounting and 
funding rules, and current challenges facing the PBGC; (4) recent Bush Administration 
proposals and corporate America's response, including elimination of smoothing (FASB), 
use of a conservative corporate bond rate versus a 30-year Treasury rate (Treasury 
Department), and adjusting how risk premiums are assigned (PBGC); (5) legislation 
introduced and passed during the 108th Congress; and (6) summary, conclusions, and 
recommendations for further research. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
What are the principle problems affecting the private DB pension plan system and 
the policy solutions being proposed by the federal government? 
 
 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
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2. Subsidiary Questions 
In support of the primary research question, the chapters following will address 
these questions: 
1. Is there a problem with the DB pension plan system? 
2. What are DB plan terminations? 
3. What are the causes of plan terminations? 
4. What happens when a corporation terminates a DB pension plan? 
5. What is causing a shift from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution 
(DC) plans? 
6. What effects have the stock market, falling interest rates and a stagnant 
economy had on the DB pension plan system (2000-2002)? 
7. What oversight does the government have over corporate sponsored DB 
plans? 
8. What are the current proposed government and private sector solutions 
(FASB/PBGC/Treasury Department)? 
9. Why is the 30-year Treasury bond rate causing problems for the DB plan 
system? 
10. What are the proposed changes the 108th Congress is addressing? 
11. What are the implications of plan failures for the taxpayer? 
12. Why is corporate America opposed to the proposed changes? 
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for this research consists of the following: 
1. Literature Reviews 
Conduct pertinent literature review of books, journal and newspaper articles, web 
sites, academic databases, and other library information resources, to identify the critical 
issues facing the private DB system.  
2. Government Reports 
Analyze government-sponsored reports from the General Accounting Office 
(GAO), Department of Labor (DOL), Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS), Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), and congressional reports from 
various committees and their subcommittees, to ascertain the federal government's 
position regarding policy issues, and recommendations for policy changes. 
3. Congressional Hearings  
Analyze congressional testimony given by professionals representing private 
organizations and federal agencies, on private pensions, retirement, and taxes to gain 
insight into the issues as presented to Congress. 
4 
4. Private Sector Reports and Issue Papers 
Analyze private sector reports and issue papers from, but not limited to, the 
following organizations: American Academy of Actuaries (AAA), American Benefits 
Council (ABC), Association for Financial Professionals (AFP), Bridgewater Associates, 
Committee on Investment of Employee Benefit Assets (CIEBA), Deloitte & Touche, 
Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI), Goldman Sachs & Co., Hewitt Associates 
LLC, Morgan Stanley, and Society of Actuaries (SOA), to gain a better understanding of 
the pension related challenges that the private sector is most concerned with.  
5. Legislation 
Review federal legislation pertinent to the operation and administration of the 
private DB pension plan system, including the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA) of 1974, Single-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1986, Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC) of 1986, Pension Protection Act/Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1987, Retirement Protection Act of 1994, The Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001, The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, and 
the Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004. 
 
E. CHAPTER CONTENTS 
Chapter II provides an overview of the private DB system.  The chapter begins 
with a brief description of qualified retirement plans, both DB and DC, followed by a 
detailed description of DB plans, the different types, alternatives to benefits, and funding 
rules.  The chapter closes with a snapshot of the private DB system today. 
Chapter III presents an in depth look at the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
(PBGC), from its beginning until now, how the corporation is organization and its role in 
the private pension system. 
Chapter IV focuses on the challenges facing the private DB pension system in 
2004: the demographic changes, an overview of corporate America's frustration with the 
system, the complexities of current funding and administration rules, and the challenges 
facing the PBGC. 
5 
Chapter V addresses recent proposals from the Bush Administration and the 108th 
Congress designed to improve plan funding and reduce future terminations, followed by a 
summary of corporate America's response to the proposals. 
Chapter VI presents a brief summary, conclusions and recommendations for 
further study. 
 
F. BENEFIT OF STUDY 
The primary benefit of the research is to provide insight into the financial 
structure and problems affecting the private pension system within the U.S., and the 


























II. OVERVIEW OF DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS 
A. QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS 
1. Defined 
To encourage employers to offer retirement plans to their employees, the federal 
government offers tax preferential treatment as defined by section 401 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (IRC) to employers who offer "qualified retirement plans."  This 
preferential treatment provides an incentive for employers to voluntarily offer and 
maintain retirement plans for their employees, thereby attracting and retaining a work 
force  while also receiving tax benefits for ensuring employee retirement security. 
A qualified employee plan is an employer's stock bonus, pension, or 
profit-sharing plan that is for the exclusive benefit of employees or their 
beneficiaries and that meets Internal Revenue Code requirements.  It 
qualifies for special tax benefits, such as tax deferral for employer 
contributions and capital gain treatment or the 10-year tax option for 
lump-sum distributions.7   
An employer that maintains a qualified plan receives tax deductions for 
contributions to the plan.  Contributions (including earnings and gains) are generally tax-
free until distributed to the employee.8  These contributions, held in tax-exempt trusts, 
provide a source of income to the employer in addition to accruing employee benefits. 
In order to qualify for preferential tax treatment, employers are required to satisfy 
minimum participation, coverage and non-discrimination rules set forth in the IRC, as 
well as standards governing the conduct of plan sponsors (fiduciaries) set forth in the 
Employee Retirement Act of 1974 (ERISA).9  Employers failing to satisfy these 
minimum rules can either be penalized financially or lose their preferential tax treatment.  
 
 
                                                 
7 Internal Revenue Service.  (2003).  Pension and Annuity Income (Publication No. 575).  Retrieved 
April 07, 2004, from http://www.irs.gov/publications/p575/index.html.  3.  
8 Ibid., 7. 
9 General Accounting Office.  (2002).  Answers to Key Questions about Private Pension Plans (Report 
No. GAO-02-745SP).  Retrieved April 01, 2004, from http://www.gao.gov/.  6. 
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2. Types 
There are two basic types of qualified retirement plans, defined contribution (DC) 
and defined benefit (DB).   
a. Defined Contribution 
A defined contribution plan provides an individual account for each 
participant in the plan.  It provides benefits to a participant largely based 
on the amount contributed to that participant's account.  Any income, 
expenses, gains, losses, and forfeitures of other accounts that may be 
allocated to an account also affect benefits.  A defined contribution plan 
can be either a profit-sharing plan or a money purchase pension plan.10  
In traditional DC plans, contributions (pretax or after tax) are made by an 
employee, his employer or both, to an individual account (similar to a mutual fund) under 
the plan, and generally capped at a set rate, such as 5 percent of annual earnings.11  
Employer contributions are contingent on employee contributions.12  The benefits 
provided by a DC plan are the gains and losses (investment return) of these contributions.  
Types of DC plans include 401(k) plans, 403(b) plans, employee stock ownership plans, 
and profit sharing plans. 
An example of a traditional 401(k) plan is as follows: an employee 
contributes 5 percent of his or her pretax wages into a designated account under the plan; 
the employer then "matches" these funds by contributing $0.50 for every $1, for a total 
annual contribution of 2.5 percent of wages. 
DC plans afford the employee limited control over how account assets are 
invested, yet the employee bears all investment risk.  DC plans do not promise a fixed 
amount at retirement; rather, employees receive their individual account balance.  This 
balance may fluctuate because of stock market performance.  DC plans expose 
employees to the risk of outliving their retirement investments because of poor 
                                                 
10 Internal Revenue Service.  (2003). Retirement Plans for Small Business (Publication No. 560).  
Retrieved April 07, 2004, from http://www.irs.gov/publications/p560/index.html.  16, 19. 
11 U.S. Department of Labor.  (October 2003).  What You Should Know About Your Retirement Plan 
(Employee Benefits Security Administration Report).  Retrieved March 30, 2004, from 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/wyskapr.html .  9. 
12 General Accounting Office.  (2002).  Answers to Key Questions about Private Pension Plans 
(Report No. 02-745SP).  Retrieved April 01, 2004, from http://www.gao.gov/.  9. 
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investment performance, poor stock market performance, or both.  Upon retirement, 
employees usually take delivery of their account balances in a lump sum. 
The benefits of DC plans include the "portability" of plan assets, control 
of the retirement assets, and pre-retirement access to their account balance.  
b. Defined Benefit 
A defined benefit plan is any plan that is not a defined contribution plan.  
Contributions to a defined benefit plan are based on what is needed to 
provide definitely determinable benefits to plan participants.  Actuarial 
assumptions and computations are required to figure these contributions.13 
Traditional DB plans are employer sponsored and provide benefits to 
employees in one of two forms: a lifetime annuity or a lump sum payment.  Benefits are 
commonly determined using a formula based on an employee’s average pay and years of 
service.  By design, DB plans are most rewarding to those employees with the longest 
service. 
DB plans are considered a “secure retirement” and are attractive for 
several reasons: (1) benefits are for the most part fixed (increasing due to cost of living 
adjustments) and not subject to stock market performance; (2) DB pension plans are 
“guaranteed.”  The employer has promised either a lump sum or a lifetime annuity based 
on the employee’s accrued benefits.  If promised an annuity, employees will not outlive 
their retirement; (3) plan sponsors (employers) are responsible for contributions to a 
pension trust fund on the employee’s behalf, and are responsible for investing and 
managing plan assets, and bear all of the investment risk; (4) an employee's benefits are 
insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, a federal agency, against losses 
due to company insolvency.14 
c. Hybrid 
Hybrid plans are retirement plans that incorporate aspects of both DB and 
DC plans.  Traditional hybrid plans are DB plans, designed to mimic DC plans, often 
                                                 
13 Internal Revenue Service.  (2003). Retirement Plans for Small Business (Publication No. 560). 
Retrieved April 07, 2004, from http://www.irs.gov/publications/p560/index.html.  16, 19.  
14 Sutkowski & Rhoads LTD.  (n.d.).  FAQ about Overview of Employee Benefit Plans.  Retrieved 




called notional defined contribution (NDC) plans.  Generally, hybrid plans are employer 
sponsored, and imitate DC plans in several ways: (1) benefits are offered in lump sum 
payments upon retirement or termination of employment; (2) benefits are expressed in the 
form of an account balance; (3) benefits accrue more quickly earlier in the life of the 
plan, thereby benefiting employees who terminate employment after only several years, 
(unlike DB plans, which benefit long-term employees).  
Similar to traditional DB plans, hybrid plan sponsors make all 
contributions, maintain control of account assets, are responsible for account risk, and 
guarantee accrued benefits.  Most common hybrid plans include Cash Balance and 
Pension Equity Plans.15 
In addition to traditional hybrid plans, a Floor-Offset arrangement includes 
two separate but associated DB and DC plans.  The DB plan provides the minimum 
benefit (or floor) while the DC plan offsets the benefits received.  Simply put, the 
employee receives whichever amount is greater of the two at retirement.16 
Hybrid plans are attractive to employees today because they are 
transparent, portable and secure. 
3. Investment 
a. Employer versus Employee Risk  
The location of the risk of investment loss for qualified pensions depends 
on whether or not the plan is DB or DC.  Sponsors of DB plans contribute to a plan's trust 
fund on behalf each employee.  The plan sponsor, known as the fiduciary, invests plan 
assets.  Since the accrued benefits are guaranteed to the employee, the risk of investment 
loss falls to the employer.  
 ERISA established protection for DB plans, including minimum funding 
rules and a requirement for additional funding if plan assets fall below a certain level.  
Additionally ERISA established the PBGC, which protects DB plans against loss due to 
insolvency (ERISA will be discussed further in Chapter III). 
                                                 
15 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (Winter 2003).  Pension Insurance Data Book 2002.  
Retrieved 19 April 2004, from http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/databook/databook02.pdf.  5. 
16 General Accounting Office.  (2002).  Answers to Key Questions about Private Pension Plans 
(Report No. GAO-02-745SP).  Retrieved April 01, 2004, from http://www.gao.gov/.  22-23. 
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In a DC plan, the benefit received by the employee is the account balance 
of invested contributions.  Risk of plan investment loss falls on the employee regardless 
of who makes plan investment decisions.  DC plans are not guaranteed by the PBGC 
because benefits received at retirement are based on plan assets rather than accrued 
benefits, as are DB plans. 
DC and DB plans offering lump sum distributions pose the additional risk 
of a retiree outliving his or her benefits.  This comes as an increased probability due to 
one or more of the following: poor investment decisions, poor stock market performance, 
or rapid consumption of account assets upon retirement. 
In traditional hybrid plans such as Cash Balance plans, employers 
contribute on behalf of employees and are responsible for investment risk. 
 
B. DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS 
1. Plan types 
a. Single-Employer Plans 
An employer may sponsor a single-employer plan for employees either 
unilaterally, or in conjunction with a labor union.17  The IRC sets minimum funding and 
participation rules for this type of plan.  Today there are approximately 34.5 million 
Americans covered by 29,500 single-employer plans.18 
b. Multiemployer Plans 
Multiemployer plans consist of at least two or more employers who jointly 
sponsor a DB plan, in conjunction with a collective bargaining agreement, and are often 
confused with multi-employer plans.19  Multiemployer plans often cover a group of 
workers in a particular unionized sector of industry such as steel, construction, and 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 2. 
18 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (2004).  2003 Annual Report.  Retrieved March 30, 2004, 
from http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/annrpt/default.htm.  Inside cover. 
19 Multi-employer plans consist of a group of single-employer plans under "common control."  
Employers choose to sponsor multi-employer plans to benefit from increased investment returns resulting 
from pooling plan assets with other plans.  ERISA classifies plans under "common control" of a group of 
sponsors as single-employer plans and labels them as a "controlled group."  Employers sponsoring plans of 
this type will typically maintain separate plans so that their contributions only benefit the employees 
covered under their plan.  Further, these plans do not include a collective bargaining agreement unlike other 
single or multiemployer plans. 
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textiles.  Generally, management and union officials determine plan details and together 
oversee plan coverage.  Multiemployer plans facilitate the changing of jobs within an 
industry while also maintaining an individual worker's accrued benefits.20  Today there 
are approximately 9.7 million people covered by 1,600 multiemployer plans.21  
2. Benefits Received 
a. Common Designs 
As noted above, most DB plans provide benefits in the form of a lifetime 
annuity, or if offered, as a lump sum.  By design, DB plans usually reward employees 
with the longest service.   
Employers determine employee benefits in one of several ways.  The first 
method uses a formula, which includes a percentage of annual salary, average salary, and 
years of service (see example below).  Assuming an employee's wages are highest at 
retirement, DB plans by design are most rewarding to those employees with the longest 
service.   
Percentage of annual wages * number of years served * average of last 
three years' wages 
e.g., 
1.25% * 25 years * $50,000 = $15,625 
Employers whose workforce is comprised of predominantly hourly 
employees typically offer flat benefit plans.  Benefits are calculated using a 
predetermined dollar amount (per month), multiplied by the years of service.  Employees 
participating in flat benefit plans, regardless of wage rate, receive the same base benefit.  
Flat benefit plans will typically increase every three to five years, or when the union and 
the sponsor renegotiate the collective bargaining or labor contract.22  
                                                 
20 General Accounting Office.  (2002).  Answers to Key Questions about Private Pension Plans 
(Report No. GAO-02-745SP).  Retrieved April 01, 2004, from http://www.gao.gov/.  22-23. 
21 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (2004).  2003 Annual Report.  Retrieved March 30, 2004, 
from http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/annrpt/default.htm.  Inside cover. 
22 Hearing before the Committee on Education and the Workforce, U.S. House of Representatives, 
108th Cong., (2003, October 29) (Mark J. Iwry).  Retrieved March 24, 2004, from 
http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/views/testimony/iwry/20031029.pdf. 
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Generally, distribution begins at retirement age as specified by the plan or 
age 65.  By law, benefit distribution must begin by the calendar year in which the 
employee reaches the age of 70½.23 
b. Annuities 
DB annuity payments differ depending on the plan and may be distributed 
as either fixed or variable, and at different periods, i.e., monthly, quarterly, or annually.  
Payment usually continues for the rest of the retiree's life.  Different annuity forms 
include fixed-period annuities, annuities for a single life, joint and survivor annuities, and 
variable annuities.24 
c. Lump Sum 
Depending on the plan, employees may opt for a lump sum distribution 
instead of a lifetime annuity.  In order to accurately determine the benefit amount 
"actuarially" equivalent to the total lifetime annuity, plan sponsors use assumptions 
consisting of an applicable interest rate (i.e., 30-year Treasury bond rate or corporate 
bond rate) and IRS-provided mortality tables.25  
d. Spousal Coverage 
DB plans are required to provide married couples with qualified joint and 
survivor annuities.  Qualified joint and survivor annuities guarantee the spouse payment 
of accrued benefits after the plan participant dies.  Additionally, DB plans are required to 
provide a qualified pre-retirement annuity to spouses of vested plan participants who die 
before they are eligible to receive retirement benefits.26 
e.  Limits 
The IRC established maximum benefits that an individual may receive in a 
single year.  This limit increases as the cost of living goes up.  For 2004, the maximum 
annual benefit must not exceed the lesser of:  
                                                 
23 Internal Revenue Service.  (2003). Retirement Plans for Small Business (Publication No. 560).  
Retrieved April 07, 2004, from http://www.irs.gov/publications/p560/index.html.  16, 19. 
24 Internal Revenue Service.  (2003).  Pension and Annuity Income (Publication No. 575).  Retrieved 
April 07, 2004, from http://www.irs.gov/publications/p575/index.html.  3. 
25 U.S. Congress.  (March 10, 2003).  Present Law and Background Relating to Employer-Sponsored 
Defined Benefit Plans and the Financial Position of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (Joint 
Committee on Taxation Report No. JCX-16-03).  Retrieved April 09, 2004, from 
http://www.hoU.S.e.gov/jct/x-16-03.pdf.  17-18. 
26 Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. Section 401(a)(11).  
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(1) 100 percent of average compensation for the employee's highest 
three consecutive years or 
(2) $165,000.27 
3. Funding Rules 
a. In General 
Prior to passage of ERISA, few laws governed fiduciaries of DB plans and 
often employees had little guarantee of receiving their promised benefits upon retirement.  
ERISA and the IRC established rules to protect DB plan participants. 
b. Minimum Funding 
DB plans are subject to minimum funding rules in order to ensure that 
employer contributions are sufficient to pay all plan participant benefits upon 
distribution.  The annually required contribution is equal to the amount needed to fund 
benefits earned during the year (known as the normal cost of the plan) plus an amortized 
portion of all other plan liabilities (known as supplemental cost).  Plan sponsors 
(employers with more than 100 employees) failing to fund plans to the minimum required 
levels during a plan year are required to make additional contributions.  These additional 
contributions (known as deficit reduction contributions) require plan funding to 90 
percent of current liability (all liabilities to employees and their beneficiaries under the 
plan), with certain exceptions.28    
c.  Deduction Rules 
As noted above, employer contributions to DB plans are tax deductible, 
subject to maximum limits.  Generally, the maximum amount deducted is not less than 
the plan's unfunded current liability. 29 
                                                 
27 Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. Section 414 (b)(1), and Internal Revenue Service.  
(2003). Retirement Plans for Small Business (Publication No. 560).  Retrieved April 07, 2004, from 
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p560/index.html.  13. 
28 Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. Section 412(b) and (l)(7)(A), and General Accounting 
Office.  (2002).  Answers to Key Questions about Private Pension Plans (Report No. GAO-02-745SP).  
Retrieved April 01, 2004, from http://www.gao.gov/.  21-23. 
29 Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. Section 404(a)(1)(D)(i)., and Internal Revenue Service.  
(2003). Retirement Plans for Small Business (Publication No. 560).  Retrieved April 07, 2004, from 
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p560/index.html.  13. 
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d. Required Interest Rate 
The rate used in interest calculation must be within a permissible range 
(+/- 10 percent) of the weighted average of the interest rate on 30-year Treasury 
securities, based on the four-year period prior to the first day of the plan year. 30   
e. Penalties 
Plan sponsors failing to meet the minimum, or exceed the maximum 
funding limits, or who fail to distribute accrued benefits as required, are subject to excise 
tax penalties. 
A plan sponsor failing to meet minimum funding requirements during a 
plan year is subject to an excise tax of 10 percent on the amount of the accumulated 
funding deficiency, and if not corrected within a taxable "period," employers are subject 
to a tax equal to 100 percent of the unfunded amount.31   
There are restrictions in place limiting the tax deductions employers may 
receive on contributions made to fully funded plans.  Employers funding in excess of 
maximum funding limits are subject to an excise tax of 10 percent applied to all 
contributions over the maximum funding limit as described above.32 
If a sponsor fails to make the minimum required distribution to plan 
participants during a plan year, the employer is subject to an excise tax of 50 percent of 
the amount which was not distributed.33 
f. Insurance 
If a company fails, freezes a plan, or terminates a plan or plans, the PBGC 
assumes responsibility for the company's plan assets and assumes administrative control 
of the plan.  However, employers that are capable of fully funding a plan upon 
termination are required to do so.  The PBGC guarantees vested employees and retirees a 
specified dollar amount, which changes annually.  Thus, when PBGC assumes control of 
a plan, participants receive benefits, even though these benefits may not equal their 
accrued amount.   
                                                 
30 Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. Section 412(b)(5)(B)(ii)(I). 
31 Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. Section 4971. 
32 Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. Section 4972. 
33 Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. Section 4974. 
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C. THE QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLAN SYSTEM IN 2004 
1. In General 
The most current Department of Labor statistics regarding pensions, based on 
information compiled from the individual employer-filed IRS Form 5500, date back to 
1998.  Because of the important economic developments of 2000-2002, this information 
has been used sparingly.  In its place, unofficial survey and statistical data have been 
employed to better illustrate the status of the retirement system in the US today. 
In 2001, less than half (43 percent) of the US labor force (~151 million) 
participated in retirement plans.  In slightly different terms, the number of family heads 
participating in an employer-offered plan was 41.6 percent (see Table 1).  Analysis 
conducted by the Employee Benefits Research Institute, narrows the focus down further, 
estimating that of those workers who participated in retirement plans in 2001, 21.3 
percent participated in DB plans, 61.5 percent participated in DC plans, and 17.1 percent 















Year Wage and 
Salary Workers 
Age 21-64
Worker Category Total 151.3 125.4 105.3 20 90
Works for an employer sponsoring a plan 80.7 74.6 57.8 16.8 58.6
Participating in a Plan 63.2 60.4 45.4 15 51.1
Worker Category Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Works for an employer sponsoring a plan 53.4 59.5 54.9 83.7 65.1





Table 1. Workers Participating in Employer Sponsored Retirement Plans 2002 [After Ref. 
30] 
 
A significant amount of US capital is invested in retirement plans.  In 2000, the 
Federal Reserve estimated that 25 percent of America's assets were held in pension funds 
                                                 
34 Employee Benefit Research Institute.  (2004, January).  Notes Vol. 25 No. 1.  Available from 
http://www.ebri.org/store/notes.htm.  2., and Employee Benefit Research Institute.  (2003, October).  
Employment-Based Retirement and Pension Plan Participation: Declining Levels and Geographic 
Differences (EBRI Issue Brief No. 262).  Available from http://www.ebri.org/store/ebriib.htm.  1. 
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($11.57 trillion).35  At the end of 2002, the amount had decreased to approximately $9.98 
trillion (see Figure 1).  Of this amount, 16 percent or $1.6 trillion was held in private DB 









1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2002
($ in trillions)
 
Figure 1.   Total Retirement Plan Assets, 1985-2002 [After Ref. 14] 
 
According to analysis conducted by the Employee Benefit Research Institute 
(EBRI), the larger the employer, the greater the probability they are participating in a 
retirement plan.  In 2002, for example, only 16.5 percent of employees working for 
employers with fewer than 10 employees participated in a retirement plan, while 59.5 
percent of employees working for an employer with greater than 1000 employees 
participated in retirement plans.   
2. The Defined Benefit Plan System 
In 1991, 90 percent of the Fortune 500 companies offered DB plans, which 
included approximately 26 million active participants.  By 2002, this ratio declined to 
approximately 75 percent, or 23 million active participants in.37 In 1985, 30.5 percent of 
                                                 
35 ERISA at 25: Has the Law Kept Pace with the Evolving Pension and Investment World?, Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations Committee on Education and the Workforce, 
U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Cong. (2000, February 15) (John B. Shoven,  Director, Stanford 
Institute for Economic Policy Research, Stanford University).  Retrieved April 30, 2004, from 
http://www.hoU.S.e.gov/ed_workforce/hearings/106th/eer/erisa21500/shoven.htm., and Employee Benefit 
Research Institute.  (2003, December).  Facts from EBRI.  Retrieved April 09, 2004, from 
http://www.ebri.org/facts/1203fact.pdf.  1. 
36 Employee Benefit Research Institute.  (2003, December).  Facts from EBRI.  Retrieved April 09, 
2004, from http://www.ebri.org/facts/1203fact.pdf.  1. 
37 Committee on Investment of Employee Benefit Assets.  (2004, March 30).  The U.S. Pension 
Crisis: Evaluation and Analysis of Emerging Defined Benefit Pension Issues.  Retrieved March 30, 2004, 
from http://www.afponline.org/pub/pr/pr_20040318_ciebamissiles.html.  7. 
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private sector wage and salary employees participated in a DB plan; in 2004, after a 
continual decline, only 20 percent participant in DB plans.38   
The DB system peaked in 1985 when it included 112,208 single-employer, and 
2,188 multiemployer plans.  In 2004, there are 29,512 single-employer and 1,623 
multiemployer plans.  Over this period, the significant decline in single-employer plans 
can largely be attributed to the termination of small-employer plans (<25 participants).39  
The period of greatest loss came during the early 1990s when small employer plans were 
declining at a rate of 12 percent per year.40   
The opposite is true for the number of Americans participating in DB plans.  The 
number of participants, which includes both retired and active, is on the rise.  Today, the 
DB system includes 34.5 million participants in single-employer and 9.7 million in 
multiemployer plans.  In 1985, there were 29.8 million in single-employer, and 8.2 
million in multiemployer plans.41  This growth is partly due to the increase in the number 
of inactive participants (retirees) from 11 million in 1985 to nearly 21 million in 2000 
(latest available numbers). 
In 1985 when the DB plan system was at its peak, DB plan assets accounted for 
34 percent of all retirement assets.  In 2002, DB plans accounted for approximately 16 
percent of all retirement assets, representing 6 percent of all US stock equity holdings, 
and were valued at $1.6 trillion (see Figure 2).42 
                                                 
38 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (2004, Spring).  Pension Insurance Data Book 2003.  
Retrieved  June 01, 2004, from http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/databook/databook03.pdf.  Table S-33. 
39 Ibid.,  Tables S-31 and M-6. 
40 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (n.d.).  Trends in Defined Benefit Pension Plan.  Retrieved 
May 03, 2004, from http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/annrpt/2002txt/2002plantrends.htm. 
41 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (2004, Spring).  Pension Insurance Data Book 2003.  
Retrieved  June 01, 2004, from http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/databook/databook03.pdf.  Table S-30 
and M-5. 
42 Employee Benefit Research Institute.  (2003, December).  Facts from EBRI.  Retrieved April 09, 














































III. PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION (PBGC) 
A. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 (ERISA) 
AND SUBSEQUENT ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PBGC 
1. Background 
Prior to the passing of ERISA, DB plan sponsors were governed by few 
regulations and as a result, thousands of employees lost their promised pensions due to 
plan terminations.  In an effort to curb the loss to employees, Senator Vance Hartke, 
backed by the United Auto Workers, introduced "The Federal Reinsurance of Private 
Pensions Act" in Congress in 1964.43  This legislation, riding on the bow wave of a 
recent termination, focused congressional attention on the unregulated private pension 
system. 
Only a few months before, while experiencing financial difficulties, the 
Studebaker-Packard Corporation terminated its second pension plan in five years.  The 
termination affected 6500 workers leaving a majority without promised retirement 
benefits.  This single event became pivotal in the political process, used repeatedly to 
demonstrate egregious employer behavior.  The termination settlement left 4400 
employees with greatly reduced benefits, fully protecting only those that were retired, or 
those currently employed over the age of sixty.  Plan participants from these two groups 
received 100 percent of their retirement.  Vested employees less than sixty years of age 
received lump-sum payments worth only about 15 percent of their accrued benefits.  
Those without vested benefits, including all employees under age forty, received 
nothing.44  Later, it was determined that plan underfunding equaled $15 million, which is 
the equivalent of $9.1 billion in 2004 dollars.  As a reference, the combined total from the 
top ten largest single-employer claims since PBGC's inception in 1974 is $10.7 billion.45 
                                                 
43 Wooten, James A.  (2001).  The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business: The Studebaker-
Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA (Buffalo Law Review Vol. 49, 686).  Retrieved May 02, 
2004, from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=290812. 
44 Ibid., 730. 
45 Bureau of Labor Statistics.  (n.d.). Inflation Calculator.  Retrieved 12 May 2004, from 
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl.,  and Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (2004, Spring).  Pension 
Insurance Data Book 2003.  Retrieved  June 01, 2004, from 
http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/databook/databook03.pdf.  Table S-5. 
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2. The Passing of ERISA 
Under this law, which is entitled the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974, the men and women of our labor force will have 
much more clearly defined rights to pension funds and greater assurances 
that retirement dollars will be there when they are needed.  Employees 
will also be given greater tax incentives to provide for their own 
retirement if a company plan is unavailable.   
President Gerald Ford46 
The purpose of ERISA is to secure the benefits of plan participants in private 
pensions (both DB and DC) and health benefit plans (beyond the scope of this paper) 
through federalized funding and administration.  Congress intended for this legislation to 
eliminate and prevent further abuses of the private pension system, thereby protecting 
employee benefits.  ERISA rules pertaining to pensions include minimum standards for 
vesting periods, funding, reporting and disclosure, and participation, as well as certain 
standards of conduct for plan fiduciaries.47  ERISA also requires all plan assets to be held 
in a trust, exempt from the sponsor's creditors,48 and shifted administrative oversight of 
retirement plans from the IRS to the Department of Labor (DOL).  Further, ERISA 
established the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), a federal corporation 
(previously mentioned) to establish and administer a plan termination insurance program, 
created to protect employees from losing their accrued benefits when an employer 
terminates a pension plan, either voluntarily or involuntarily.  
3. ERISA Structure 
Since its enactment, ERISA has been amended several times, however its 
structure has remained the same.  ERISA includes four titles, as described below.49 
• Title I includes key definitions and delineates principal rules for funding, 
reporting and disclosure, fiduciary duties, prohibited transactions, 
                                                 
46 Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation.   (n.d.).  Statement by President Gerald R. Ford Upon 
Signing the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.  Retrieved May 04, 2004, from 
http://www.pbgc.gov/about/signing.htm. 
47 Department of Labor.   (n.d.).  History of EBSA and ERISA.  Retrieved May 04, 2004, from 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/aboutebsa/history.html. 
48 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. Section 1103(a). 
49 Department of Labor.   (n.d.).  History of EBSA and ERISA.  Retrieved May 04, 2004, from 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/aboutebsa/history.html. 
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enforcement, and establishes the Employee Benefits Security 
Administration (EBSA) (previously the Pension Welfare Benefits 
Administration (PWBA)) with the DOL as its administrative authority. 
• Title II establishes a set of tax standards providing employees and 
employers with a means to qualify for favorable tax treatment and amend 
three of the Title I rules in the Internal Revenue Code, specifically plan 
participation, vesting and funding.    
• Title III defines roles in oversight, jurisdiction, administration and 
enforcement of regulations between the DOL and the IRS. 
• Title IV establishes the PBGC, which created the single-employer and 
multiemployer plan termination insurance programs.  
 
B. PBGC ORGANIZATION 
1. Overview 
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) protects the pensions 
of nearly 44.3 million working men and women in more than 31,000 
private defined benefit pension plans, including 34.5 million people 
covered by 29,500 single-employer plans and more than 9.7 million 
people covered by over 1,600 multiemployer plans.50   
The purpose of the DB pension plan insurance program is threefold: (1) to ensure 
the timely and continued distribution of earned retirement benefits; (2) to support the 
private pension plan system, providing oversight for the administration of these plans, 
ensuring their continuation; and (3) to provide plan insurance while maintaining 
premiums at the lowest possible level.51     
2. Leadership 
The PBGC is led by an executive director, and is subject to several governing and 
advisory bodies, as prescribed by Title IV of ERISA.  The Board of Directors includes 
the Secretary of Labor (chairman), the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of 
Commerce.  Its purpose is to oversee investment policy.  The PBGC Advisory 
                                                 
50 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (2004).  2003 Annual Report.  Retrieved March 24, 2004, 
from http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/annrpt/default.htm.  Inside cover. 
51 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. Section 1302(a)(1)-(3). 
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Committee, consisting of presidentially-appointed members from corporate America, 
represents three groups of stakeholders: those representing the interests of the general 
public, those representing private employers, and those representing the interests of 
employee organizations.52 
3. The PBGC Today 
At 2003 year-end, the PBGC experienced a loss of $7.6 billion in its single-
employer program, a decrease from the loss recorded the previous year, expanding its 
deficit to $11.2 billion.  The multiemployer program experienced a loss of $419 million, 
creating a $261 million deficit, its first deficit in more than 20 years.  Labor Secretary 
Elaine Chao attributes these discouraging numbers, in part, to the underfunding of 
America's private pension system (see Figure 3), estimating a lack of plan funding in 
excess $350 billion, "by far the largest fiscal year-end number ever recorded."53   
 
Figure 3. Total Underfunding in PBGC Insured Single-Employer  Plans 1980-2003 
[After Ref. 25] 
 
The overall performance of the insurance program has sparked significant 
attention, including a series of reforms proposed by the PBGC, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB), and the IRS.  The General Accounting Office (GAO) considers 
both programs at risk, placing the single-employer program in its "High Risk" category, 
                                                 
52 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (2004).  2003 Annual Report.  Retrieved March 24, 2004, 
from http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/annrpt/default.htm.  26, 41. 
53 Ibid., 1. 
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simultaneously citing a number of challenges facing the multiemployer program in a 
recent testimony before Congress.54  Even though the single-employer program's future 
appears bleak (see Figure 4), the PBGC claims its program is "not in a crisis."55   
 
 
Figure 4. PBGC Single-Employer Program Assets Liabilities and Net Position 
1975-2002 [After Ref. 25] 
 
Fortunately for the more than 930,000 workers and retirees in 3,240 "trusteed" 
plans who rely on the PBGC to pay their retirement benefits, liabilities, as depicted above 
(Figure 4), are calculated on an annualized basis, representing total liabilities, both 
current and future.  In fact, annual distributions historically require only a small 
percentage of the total assets to cover current liabilities.  In 2003, for example, current 
liabilities represented only 5.5 percent of total liabilities and required only 7.3 percent of 
                                                 
54 Private Pensions: Multiemployer Pensions Face Key Challenges to their Long-Term Prospects, 
hearing before the Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations, Committee on Education and the 
Workforce, U.S. House of Representatives, 108th Cong., (2004, March 18) (Barbara D. Bovbjerg, Director, 
Education Workforce, and Income Security Measures, GAO).  Retrieved March 24, 2004, from 
http://www.gao.gov/. 
55 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (2004).  2003 Annual Report.  Retrieved 24 March 30, 
2004, from http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/annrpt/default.htm.  Inside cover. 
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total assets.  PBGC estimates that its $34 billion in assets will keep the corporation 
solvent and able to distribute uninterrupted benefit payments until at least 2019.56 
By the end of 2003, the PBGC had assumed the role of trustee for 152 plans, 
representing 206,000 people.57  The termination of Bethlehem Steel's pension plan, also 
during 2003, was the single largest plan loss by one company, and added 95,000 
participants (67,000 retirees) to the growing number that rely on the PBGC.  This 
termination created a liability of approximately $3.6 billion, over 60 percent of the 
liabilities entrusted to the PBGC during 2003, and nearly ten percent of total liabilities.58   
At 2003 year-end, the PBGC distributed benefits totaling $2.5 billion, yet another 
record, up nearly $1 billion from the year previous.  These record distributions were 
balanced, in part, by income generated from premium payments and improved 
investment performance from the previous years.  Investment income equaled $3.4 
billion, with a return on investments of 10.3 percent, far exceeding 2002's return of only 
2.1 percent (see Figure 5).59 
                                                 
56 General Accounting Office.  (2003, October).  Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Single-
Employer Pension Insurance Program Faces Significant Long-Term Risks (Report No. GAO-04-90).  
Retrieved March 24, 2004, from  http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0490.pdf.  15. 
57 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (2004).  2003 Annual Report.  Retrieved March 24, 2004, 
from http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/annrpt/default.htm.  1, 7. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., 2. 
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(Dollars in millions) 2003 2002 (Annual Rates of Return)
Summary of Operations
5 Year Avg 
September 30,
Premium Income $973 $812 2003 2002 2003
Losses from Plan Terminations $5,377 $9,313 Total Invested Funds 10.30% 2.10% 5.00%
Investment Income $3,386 $288 Equities 25.8 (17.0) 2.1
Actuarial Charges and Adjustments $6,162 $2,802 Fixed-Income 4.2 14.4 6.5
Trust Fund 22.9 (15.5) 2.4
Insurance Activity Revolving Funds 3.8 14.4 6.5
Benefits Paid $2,489 $1,538
Retirees 459,190   344,770   Indices
Total Participants Receiving or Owed Benefits 934,000   783,000   Wilshire 5000 26.3 (17.5) 2.0
New Underfunded Terminations 155          157          S&P 500 Stock Index 24.4 (20.5) 1.0
Terminated/Trusteed Plans (cumulative) 3,287       3,132       Lehman Brothers Long Treasury Index 3.7 14.5 6.5
Financial Position
Single-Employer Program
Total Assets $34,016 $25,430
Total Liabilities $45,254 $29,068
Net Loss ($7,600) ($11,370)
Net Position ($11,238) ($3,638)
Multiemployer Program
Total Assets $1,000 $944
Total Liabilities $1,261 $786
Net Income (Loss) ($419) $42
Net Position ($261) $158








The PBGC, a federal corporation, created in accordance with ERISA and the 
Government Corporation Control Act, receives no funding from general tax revenue.60  
Rather, financing comes from insurance premiums paid by sponsors of private DB plans, 
investment income, terminated plan assets, and recoveries from the sponsors of 
terminated plans. 
a. Federal Funding 
As delineated by ERISA, the PBGC self-finances its operations; however, 
in the event that it is required, the PBGC has a $100 million line of credit with the US 
Treasury.61 
b. Investment Income 
The PBGC earned $3.4 billion in investment income during 2003.62  
Investment policy, as directed by PBGC's board of directors, the advisory council, and 
ERISA, requires the placement of invested assets in two separate accounts for each                                                  
60 Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, 31 U.S.C. Section 9101(3)(I). 
61 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (2004).  2003 Annual Report.  Retrieved March 30, 2004, 
from http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/annrpt/default.htm 26. 
62 Ibid., 2. 
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program.  Assets generated from sponsor premium payments are placed in a revolving 
fund account, and assets gained from terminated plans are placed in a trust fund.  
Revolving fund assets ($16.4 billion at fiscal year-end 2003), must be invested in fixed 
income securities.  Use of revolving fund assets is intended to support the operational and 
administrative needs of the corporation, and to fund deficits incurred when single-
employer plans terminate, or to provide financial assistance to multiemployer plans.63  
Receipts from active plan premium payments are accounted for in the revolving fund.   
ERISA allows trust fund assets ($18.1 billion at fiscal year-end 2003) to 
be invested more aggressively.  Historically they have been invested in high quality 
equity funds.  The trust fund receives its principal from trusteed plans, pending plans 
(terminated awaiting PBGC legal authority), and premiums from probable terminations. 
As of year-end 2003, the PBGC's portfolio included approximately 63 
percent cash and fixed income securities and 37 percent high-grade equities, with a small 
percentage of real estate and other financial instruments.64 
c. Insurance Premiums 
All single-employer pension plans pay insurance premiums to the PBGC.  
Originally (1974), a flat rate of $1 per participant was required.  Today, after several 
amendments over the last 25 years, the flat rate equals $19 per capita.  Variable rate 
premiums, also assessed and assigned on a per capita basis, are imposed on sponsors 
failing to maintain plan funding at the required minimums, and are paid in addition to the 
flat rate premium.  Currently, underfunded plans pay $9 per $1000 of unfunded vested 
benefits.  Unfunded amount calculations use a variable interest rate to determine to what 
extent benefits are underfunded. 65 
There have been several changes to the premium payment system over the 
last decade, each time, adjusting the maximum variable rate premium that can be 
imposed on a sponsor.  Today, there is no maximum limit.  Regulations regarding the 
interest rates used to calculate the variable rate premiums have also seen several changes                                                  
63 Ibid., 26-27. 
64 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (n.d.).  Investment Program.  Retrieved May 04, 2004, from  
http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/factshts/INVFACT2.HTM. 
65 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (n.d.).  Pension Insurance Premiums.  Retrieved May 04, 
2004, from http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/factshts/PREMFACT.HTM. 
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over the past decade.  As of January of 2004, the interest used is 85 percent of the spot 
rate for 30-year Treasury Securities.  In April of that year, Congress enacted the Pension 
Funding Equity Act of 2004, temporarily adjusting the interest rate used in premium 
calculations.  For plan years beginning after 31 December 2003 through 31 December 
2005, interest rates will be based on high-quality corporate bonds.66  The National 
Employee Savings and Trust Equity Guarantee Act (NESTEG) introduced in the second 
session of the 108th Congress (still pending at the time of writing), proposed an extension 
of the use of corporate bond rates for interest calculations, with an eventual 
implementation of a corporate yield curve.67 
The handling of multiemployer plan terminations is different from single-
employer plans, and so too is the handling of premiums.  The PBGC flat rate premium for 
all multiemployer plans is $2.60 per participant per year.68  
 
C. PBGC'S ROLE IN THE PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM 
1. Insurance Program 
The PBGC was established to insure private DB pensions against loss.  Although 
single-employer and multiemployer programs differ in several ways, both promise 
security for accrued benefits.   
a. Single-Employer Program 
The single-employer program is responsible for ensuring uninterrupted 
payment of retirement benefits to current and future retirees in the event a DB plan 
terminates.  Employers, who terminate a plan due to insolvency, because a plan runs out 
of money, or in order to stay in business, are covered by the PBGC.  Additionally, the 
PBGC has the authority to involuntarily terminate a plan in the interest of protecting  
employee benefits.  When the PBGC takes over a plan, operating rules are adjusted, 
usually eliminating further benefit accruals and further vesting, while other plan 
obligations normally cease. 69 
                                                 
66 Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, Public Law No. 108-218.  Section 101. 
67 National Employee Savings and Trust Equity Guarantee Act, S. 2424 (Senate Finance Committee 
Report No. 108-266), U.S. S., 108th Cong., (2004, May 14).  Retrieved May 15, 2004, from 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:s.02424:. 
68 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. Section 1306(a)(3)(A)(ii)(IV). 
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b. Multiemployer Program 
Under multiemployer program rules, when a plan is unable to distribute 
benefits when they are due, the PBGC will finance the plan through loans.  Before 
receiving any funding from the PBGC, all payments made by plans in excess of the 
guaranteed limit must cease. 70 
2. Plan Termination 
The PBGC's most significant role is as trustee of terminated pension plans.  In 
2003, the PBGC became trustee for 152 of 155 terminations.  There are two different 
categories of plan terminations, standard and distressed.  In either case, upon termination, 
all benefit accruals and vesting under that particular plan cease, and the PBGC assumes 
responsibility for the uninterrupted payment of benefits to current and future 
beneficiaries. 
a. Standard Termination 
A standard termination occurs when an employer terminates a plan even 
though there are sufficient funds available for plan funding.  When a plan goes through 
this process, all activities cease, all qualified benefits become fully vested, and benefits 
are distributed to plan participants.  Upon termination, the PBGC is no longer responsible 
for insuring the plan.  
b. Distressed Termination 
A distressed termination occurs when an employer terminates a plan due 
to the inability to pay all participants current and future benefits or is unable to remain in 
business without so doing.  In order to terminate a plan, an employer must satisfy one of 
four DOL distressed termination test requirements: (1) the sponsor and all members of 
the controlled group (if applicable) is being liquidated in bankruptcy or insolvency 
proceedings;  (2) the sponsor and all members of the controlled group (if applicable) are 
going through a reorganization due to bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings; (3) the 
PBGC determines that termination is necessary so that the employer can pay its debts in 
order to remain in business; or (4) the PBGC determines that termination is necessary to 
                                                 
69 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (n.d.). PBGC's Pension Guarantees.  Retrieved May 04, 
2004, from http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/factshts/GUARFACT.HTM. 
70 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (n.d.).  Multiemployer Insurance Program.  Retrieved May 
04, 2004, from http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/factshts/MULTFACT.HTM. 
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avoid significant pension costs as a result of a decline in the employer's workforce.71 
Satisfying one of these criteria, a company may voluntarily apply for a plan termination, 
or the PBGC, may involuntarily terminate a plan.72  
The PBGC retains the right to terminate an employer's plan regardless of 
whether or not the employer has filed to terminate the plan voluntarily.  Involuntary 
terminations may occur for one or more of the following reasons: (1) if the PBGC 
determines that a plan is unable to provide current and future benefits to participants; (2) 
the plan has paid a lump sum to one of its participants who is  one of  the "substantial 
owners" of the sponsoring company; or (3) if there is expected substantial future loss to 
the PBGC if the plan is not terminated.73 
c. Termination Prevention  
The PBGC monitors companies with severely underfunded plans to 
identify potential plan failures and step in before termination occurs.  This program - the 
Early Warning Program - identifies companies with a bond rating below investment 
grade who sponsor pensions with a current liability greater than $25 million and those 
sponsoring plans with a current liability greater than $25 million with unfunded current 
liability in excess of $5 million.  If a company satisfies one of these two criteria, the 
PBGC will monitor company transactions using information shared by the company, the 
DOL, IRS, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.74 
3. Expected Claim Determination 
In order to limit the effect of a significant plan termination and to forecast 
possible claims in the future, the PBGC employs the Pension Insurance Modeling System 
(PIMS).  This stochastic model, using multiple variables, attempts to forecast 
probabilities of future underfunding and claims to which the PBGC will have to 
respond.75  PIMS predicts that the median claim over the next ten years will equal 
                                                 
71 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. Section 1341(c)(2)(B). 
72 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. Section 1342. 
73 Ibid., and Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (n.d.).  Termination Fact Sheet.  Retrieved May 
04, 2004, from http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/factshts/TERMFACT.HTM. 
74 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (n.d.).  Early Warning Program.  Retrieved May 04, 2004, 
from http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/factsht/early_warning.htm. 
75 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (2004).  2003 Annual Report.  Retrieved March 30, 2004, 
from http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/annrpt/default.htm.  10-11. 
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approximately $2.2 billion per year, with a 10 percent chance of claims rising as high as 
$4.7 billion.  Half of the simulations predict PBGC's deficit will exceed $16 billion by 
2013.76 
4. Benefits 
In 2003, the PBGC paid approximately $2.5 billion in benefits to retirees and 
vested plan participants.77  The PBGC guarantees benefits to employees of terminated 
retirement plans based on the provisions of the plan up to a maximum limit.  This 
maximum limit, adjusted on an annual basis, is based on changes in the Social Security 
contribution, the plan benefit base, and the termination date.78  However, some plan 
participants may not receive their full retirement benefits.  For example, plans 
terminating in 2004 may receive a maximum annual benefit of $44,386.32 ($3,698.86 
monthly).79  For those already retired or covered by plans that terminated prior to a 
participant reaching retirement age, plan benefit distribution amounts are based on the 
termination year.  The PBGC does not guarantee all types of benefits.  Benefits not 
guaranteed include health and welfare benefits, severance benefits, lump-sum death 
benefits and disability benefits when occurring after plan termination.80 
 
 
                                                 
76 Ibid., 11. 






IV. 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES FACING THE DB PLAN 
SYSTEM  
A. OVERVIEW 
A combination of poor stock market performance, historically low interest rates, 
significant employer shifts from DB to DC plans, demographic shifts in America's 
workforce, and increased scrutiny of corporate financial performance challenge the future 
of the private DB pension plan system in the US today.  The system, backed by the 
PBGC, is underfunded by $350 billion, and the PBGC itself is experiencing financial 
difficulties, reporting a combined deficit of $11.49 billion at the end of 2003.81 
The economic downturn of the last several years (2000-2003), a time which some 
have labeled the "perfect storm," has created significant challenges for previously 
financially healthy companies.  Low interest rates (which increase plan liabilities), poor 
asset performance, and a stagnant economy have forced many firms to make the ultimate 
decision, i.e., to terminate their pension plan or risk losing the company.  In the last three 
years, the PBGC assumed responsibility for 388 plans, three of which were the largest 
terminations in its history.82  Further, in 2003 the PBGC estimated that there are a 
number of plans in danger of terminating in the near future.  These potential terminations 
represent anywhere between $83 and $85 billion of additional liability.83   
Other challenges facing the DB pension plan system include a significant shift 
from DB to DC plans, caused, according to many employers, by complex and costly DB 
plans and a demographic shift in today's labor force.   
There will always be companies within the DB pension plan system experiencing 
financial difficulties, and companies will continue to offer different types of retirement  
                                                 
81 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (2004).  2003 Annual Report.  Retrieved March 24, 2004, 
from http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/annrpt/default.htm.  2. 
82 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (2004, Spring).  Pension Insurance Data Book 2003.  
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plans to remain competitive.  Nevertheless, the combined effects of recent events have 
created a strain on the entire system, which some say challenges the future existence of 
the DB pension plan.  
 
B. DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES IN THE DB SYSTEM 
In the US, retirees are spending more time in retirement because of earlier 
retirements and longer life spans.  Today, according to the PBGC, the average male 
worker spends 18.1 years in retirement, compared to 11.5 in 1950.84  As the time spent in 
retirement increases so do pension plan liabilities.  Additionally, the US population is 
aging, and the ratio of active workers to retired workers is decreasing.  Today, active 
participants equal the number of retirees (see Figure 6).  These two factors combined 
create a scenario where employers' liabilities are growing at a faster rate then plan assets.  
As the shift from the number of active to inactive employees continues grow, the gap 
may widen. 
 
Figure 6. Active vs. Retired and Terminated Plan Participants [After Ref. 8] 
 
C. SHIFT FROM DB TO DC PLANS 
Over the past twenty years, there has been a distinct shift from DB to DC plans 
(see Figure 7).  Using data from the IRS Form 5500, David Rajnes of the Employee 
Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) documented an increase in DC plan participation, from 
                                                 
84 Ibid.,  6. 
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4 million in 1975 to 29 million in 1998 (the most recent year for which official DOL 
statistics exist).  During this same period, DB plans decreased from 103,000 to 56,000, 
while DC plans increased from 208,000 to 673,000.85   
The shift over the last twenty-five years from DB to DC plans can really be 
attributed to the shift from DB to 401(k) plans.  In 1984, 401(k) plans represented only 4 
percent of DC plans.  Today 401(k) plans account for 75 percent of DC plans.86 
 
 
Figure 7. Participation Rates in Qualified Pension Plans [After Ref. 24] 
 
Traditional DB pensions are often associated with the unionized sectors of 
American industry (e.g., steel and auto) (see Figure 8), but the trend is changing.  Over 
the past twenty years, there has been a shift in the American economy from a primarily 
industrial base to a technology and service base.  The shift has created a considerable 
challenge to the DB pension system because employers in the technology and service 
sectors are electing to offer DC rather than DB plans.  According to the Employment 
Benefit Research Institute, "Roughly, 50 percent of the increase in DC Plan market share 
can be explained by employment shifts from unionized jobs, large firms, and industries 
that traditionally offer DB plans to smaller business, and the service sector offering DC 
                                                 
85 Employee Benefit Research Institute.  (2002, September).  An Evolving Pension System: Trends in 
Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans (Issue Brief No. 249) (David Rajnes).  Available from 
Employee Benefit Research Institute http://www.ebri.org/store/ebriib.htm.  5. 
86 Gebhardtsbauer, Ron, FSA, MAAA.  (March 30, 2004).  What are the Trade-Offs? Defined Benefit 
vs. Defined Contribution Systems.  Paper presented to the AARP / CEPS Forum.  Retrieved March 30, 
2004, from http://www.actuary.org/pdf/pension/tradeoffs_march04.pdf.  
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plans."87  Employers are choosing 401(k) type plans over DB plans for several reasons, 
including ease of plan administration, lower cost, and most importantly, a shift in the 
















Figure 8. DB Plans By Industry [After Ref. 49] 
 
An employer chooses to offer a retirement plan in order to attract employees and 
retain a quality workforce.  Employers therefore are subject to market demand for their 
employees.  As the American workforce becomes increasingly fiscally aware, employers 
must respond with plans that meet the needs of the ever-changing workforce.  Today, the 
perceived value of 401(k) plans is higher than that of traditional DB plans, because the 
current demand is for transparent, portable plans, offering employer-matched funds, lump 
sum distributions, and early vesting characteristics.  With the rapid growth in DC plans, it 
is evident that the DB system is not evolving quickly enough, and is not attractive to 
today's workforce.  In order to remain competitive, employers must remain flexible, and 
                                                 
87 Employee Benefit Research Institute.  (2002, September).  An Evolving Pension System: Trends in 
Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans (Issue Brief No. 249) (David Rajnes).  Available from 
Employee Benefit Research Institute http://www.ebri.org/store/ebriib.htm.  15. 
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either alter current DB plans to mimic DC plans, or offer DC plans.  Until DB plans offer 
the characteristics the workforce desires, they risk becoming less attractive to potential 
new workers and their numbers will continue to decline.   
  
D. CORPORATE AMERICA'S FRUSTRATION WITH THE SYSTEM 
Corporate America is frustrated with the DB pension plan system, as evidenced 
by the departure of companies from the system since the late 1980s (see Figure 9).  The 
most significant decline has been in small employer plans, many attributing their 
departure to a system that is too complicated and costly.  Small employers are therefore 
shifting to more easily managed DC plans.  Since private DB pensions are voluntary, 
complicated rules and narrowly focused regulations discourage companies from 
participation.  Government micromanagement of the system, or the appearance thereof, 
further undermines company support for the DB approach to pension planning.  
 
Figure 9. PBGC Insured Plans (1980-2003) Single-Employer Program [From Ref. 
49] 
 
A bull market, to some degree, is also a source of corporate frustration.  Such 
markets free DB plan sponsors from devoting a considerable amount of time (scrutiny) 
and assets to their plans, as pension trust funds experience positive returns.  The 
economic boom in the mid-to-late 1990s is a prime example.  If employers contribute to 
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their plans above the maximum limit, funding rules will penalize employers in the form 
of a 10 percent excise tax applied to contributions over the limit.  Therefore, while assets 
performed well, instead of funding pension plans near the maximum level, employers 
only contributed enough to meet the minimum required funding levels.  That way they 
were not in danger of penalties if positive market performance placed their plan in an 
overfunded status.  Thus, many employers experienced "contribution holidays."  A 
contribution holiday refers to the period of time in which the plan is funded above 90 
percent of current liability.  In some cases, employers did not contribute to their plans for 
several years.  Some of these same employers experiencing significant financial 
difficulties in 2004 are faced with plan terminations.  If employers had been able to fund 
beyond maximum limits (which varied from 105 to 120 percent of current liability during 
this period) they would in essence have prevented much of the funding pressure they are 
now experiencing.   
During this same period (late 1990s), Congress and the federal agencies put into 
place multiple changes affecting the system.  But because assets were performing well, 
many employers did not pay close attention to the nuances of the legislation and new 
regulations.  It was not until 2001, when sponsors began to feel the effects of poor asset 
performance in the stock market and falling interest rates, that more attention was 
devoted to pension funding and accounting rules. 
The Enron debacle created an air of distrust for corporate America, resulting in 
increased scrutiny of public corporation financial performance.  Together with the 
economic downturn, these two events have generated a multitude of proposals to improve 
and prolong the life of the DB plan system.  The Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB), the Treasury Department (which includes the IRS), the PBGC, and Congress 
have all proposed changes to strengthen and protect the system.  Many in corporate 
America believe that the increased scrutiny and new rules are creating an increasingly 
complex regulatory environment, which is encouraging employers to shift to the more 
easily managed DC system. 
Corporate America is in favor of changes to the system, but the preponderance of 
proposed changes will, in their view, only exacerbate frustrations already felt by 
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employers.  Many believe that now is not the time for drastic changes to improve the 
system.  The combination of a poor performing equities market and historically low 
interest rates is unusual.  Implementing significant changes now may produce negative 
results when the system as a whole normalizes.  Changes, many believe, should only ease 
constraints on the system, improving funding and accounting rules to enable the 
continued existence of plans and employers during periods when the economy is 
performing poorly. 
Probably the greatest source of frustration felt amongst employers lies in the use 
of an obsolete interest rate for pension calculations.  The combined effects of poor equity 
performance and falling interest rates placed many employers in a crisis over the last 
several years.  In 2001, the Treasury Department ceased offering 30-year bonds, and 
subsequently the 30-year Treasury bond rate began to fall.  Until recently, employers 
were required to use the 30-year Treasury rate for all DB plan liability and lump sum 
calculations.  With the 30-year Treasury rate well below that of the market, plan sponsors 
are opposed to the use of the obsolete rate.  Since pension liabilities are calculated by 
taking the present value of future benefits, the lower the interest rate (discount rate), the 
larger the liability, thus requiring sponsors to contribute additional assets to plans in order 
to meet funding requirements.  Use of the obsolete Treasury rate, according to industry, is 
costing them billions of dollars.88   
Congress responded in 2002 and 2004 by providing employers with a temporary 
fix, enabling the use of a higher rate for present value calculations.  But in both cases, the 
temporary rate is not applicable to all calculations, requiring the continued use of the 
obsolete rate.  Further, the legislation is not permanent, expiring in 2006.  From corporate 
America's perspective, the short-term fix, though helpful, has not solved all their 
problems, and a temporary fix prevents long-term planning, introducing volatility to the 
system.   
Some believe only minor changes are needed to improve the system.  As of the 
spring of 2004, the economy has experienced three quarters of economic expansion.  As 
                                                 
88 Discount Rate Issues, testimony Before the Working Group on Defined Benefit Plan Funding and 
Discount Rate Issues, The ERISA Advisory Council, U.S. Department of Labor  (2003, June 26) (Kenneth 
Steiner, Actuary, Watson Wyatt Worldwide,).  Retrieved May 28, 2004, from 
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the stock market improves and interest rates rise, many of the problems seen over the last 
several years will normalize.  Making changes now, when the system is attempting to 
recover from unusual pressure, may exacerbate the complexity and volatility of the 
system.  Many believe that now is not the time to make significant changes to the system. 
 
E.  PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT DB PLAN STRUCTURE 
1. Accounting Rules 
a. Transparency 
The Bush Administration and the FASB have both proposed changes to 
accounting rules, in order to improve DB plan transparency.  Both agree that plan 
participants do not receive sufficient plan financial performance information.89  Those in 
favor of increased transparency believe that increasing public information will enable the 
participant to become better aware of plan funding problems earlier in their existence.  
There is a belief that increased awareness provides employers with an incentive to better 
fund financially weak plans, and solves a principal-agent problem that currently exists.  
Additionally, increased public information will enable employees to make better 
retirement, and perhaps future employment decisions, as well as prepare for impending 
terminations prior to instead of after the fact.   
b. Current vs. Termination Liabilities 
Current law requires plan sponsors to include current liability calculations 
as part of the financial performance data provided to participants.  Both the FASB and the 
Bush Administration believe employers should also provide their employees with 
termination liability calculations.  Termination liability, many believe, is a better measure 
of the risks associated with plan terminations, because it accounts for "shutdown 
benefits" as well as "other costs" that current liability does not.  These "other costs" 
include lump sum distribution payments, and a prediction of early and normal retirement 
costs.  Historically speaking, when faced with a plan termination, a greater number of 
employees choose the option to retire early or choose the option for a lump sum benefit 
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distribution, if available.  These two options, which are not normally included in current 
liability calculations, require additional assets, and place an increased strain on the plan, 
therefore increasing plan liability.90   
2.  Funding Rules 
a. Interest Rate 
 The Treasury Department started to retire federal debt in 1998 through a 
buyback program repurchasing 30-year Treasury bonds.  In October 2001, the Treasury 
Department ceased issuing 30 year-bonds.  The yields on the 30-year bonds had already 
been dropping, and have continued to drop (see Figure 10).  With the decrease in the 
supply of government-backed bonds, the interest rate on 30-year Treasury bonds has 
dropped below the long-term bond market, and as of the spring of 2004 was at a 50-year 
low.91   
 
Figure 10. Weighed Average, 30-Year Treasury Bond Interest Rate, 2002-2004 
[From Ref. 4] 
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 Pension funding calculations require the use of interest rates to identify 
plan contributions (current liability), lump sum benefit distributions, and variable rate 
premium payments to the PBGC.  During recessions, the resulting lower interest rates 
generally cause higher liability, requiring increased funding requirements; and, during 
periods of economic expansion, rising interest rates reduce funding requirements due to 
reduced liabilities.92  Using an interest rate that is below the market rate for calculations 
causes pension liabilities to be artificially high, forcing employers to contribute additional 
assets to their pension plans.  Underfunded plans pay inflated variable rate premiums to 
the PBGC.   
 To illustrate, research conducted by the American Benefits Council 
concluded that contributions by Fortune 1000 companies to DB plans between 1999 and 
2001 averaged $13.7 billion.  In 2002, contributions made by these same corporations 
totaled $43.5 billion, and contributions in 2003 and 2004 (assuming the use of the 30-
year Treasury rate) are expected to total more than $160 billion.93  In May 2004, the 
American Benefits Council published a subsequent report, again highlighting the 
negative affects of the "obsolete" 30-year rate by illustrating the monumental difference 
between the size of quarterly pension contributions using the 30-year Treasury and 
corporate bond rates.  A company expecting to use the 30-year Treasury rate calculated a 
quarterly contribution of $7.1 million.  Upon recalculation using the corporate bond rate 
this same contribution equaled $200,000.94 
 In 2002, Congress enacted the Job Creation and Workers Assistance Act 
of 2002, which included a temporary measure permitting sponsors to use an interest rate 
up to 120 percent of the 30-year Treasury rate for pension liability calculations.95  
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Congress noted that the 30-year Treasury rate was obsolete and that the interest rate used 
in pension funding calculations should match the market rate.  Even the Treasury 
Department concluded that use of the Treasury bond rate produced inaccurate 
measurements of pension liabilities.96  The legislative fix was temporary however, and 
expired in 2003.   
 The Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, the second temporary measure 
taken by Congress to fix the interest rate problem, extends the use of the corporate bond 
rate for an additional two years, but does not address the requirement to use the 30-year 
Treasury rate for lump sum benefit calculations.  Many sponsors within the DB plan 
system are eager to see permanent legislation enacted that will enable long term planning.  
Legislation in the form of the National Employee Security Trust and Equity Guarantee 
Act (NESTEG) is being considered by Congress in 2004, and if passed will provide the 
permanent interest rate adjustment that many in corporate America are seeking. 
b. Lump Sum Distributions 
Current law requires the use of the 30-year Treasury rate when calculating 
lump sum amounts to be paid by DB plans to vested participants.  As mentioned above, 
the Pension Funding Equity Act replaced the 30-year Treasury rate for liability 
calculations; it did not, however, replace the 30-year rate for lump sum calculations.  
When used, the 30-year Treasury rate artificially inflates the lump sum payment (as 
mentioned above), requiring the employer to pay an amount that is larger than a lifetime 
annuity of the same economic value.  The difference in amounts is due to the use of two 
separate interest rates for benefit calculations.  The use of the Treasury rate has created an 
incentive for employees to opt for the lump sum.  Corporate America is concerned that 
the   continued   requirement  for   the   use   of   the  30-year  Treasury rate for lump sum  
                                                 
96 Pension Funding and Its Impact on the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC): Hearings 
before the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International 
Security, U.S. Senate, 108th Cong., (2003, September 15) (Testimony of Kathy Cissna, Director of 
Retirement Plans, R.J. Reynolds, on behalf of the American Benefits Council).  Retrieved May 28, 2004, 
from http://www.abcstaff.net.   
44 
calculations will force employers to overpay retirees and provide a perverse incentive for 
participants to opt for the lump sum (if offered) over the lifetime annuity until a 
legislative fix is signed into law.97 
c. Maximum Funding Limits 
The IRC identifies a maximum limit affecting employer contributions to a 
pension plan that affects the tax treatment of the contribution.  Contributions beyond this 
limit are not tax deductible and are subject to a 10 percent excise tax.  Corporate America 
is lobbying for an increase in the maximum limit.  Many believe that current funding 
rules have prevented employers from protecting themselves from a situation very much 
like the one they experienced from 2000 to 2002 (low interest rates, poor stock market 
performance, stagnant economy).  By increasing the maximum funding limit, Congress 
would allow employers to overfund plans during periods of economic growth, protecting 
the employer and their plans from future economic downturns or poor investment 
performance.  Overfunding, simply put, allows a sponsor to "save for a rainy day." 
d. Funding Credit 
According to current law, if an employer contributes more than the 
minimum required contribution, the excess accumulates as a credit, which may be applied 
towards future contributions.  The Bush Administration and the PBGC believe this rule 
has created significant problems within the DB plan system.  In the PBGC's 2003 annual 
report, two examples are given of recent terminations that illustrate the failure of this 
rule.  In both cases (United Airlines and Bethlehem Steel), neither firm had paid into their 
funding accounts for several years prior to termination.  Funding credits permitted 
"contribution holidays."  The problem with the current funding rules, according to the 
PBGC, stems from how the credits are determined and how often they are reviewed.  
Since credit determination is merely an accounting procedure, it fails to adjust itself to 
the rise and fall of asset value.  The rule exempts sponsors in some cases from 
contributing to plans for multiple accounting periods regardless of the fair market value 
of assets held, due to a prior period qualification.98  
                                                 
97 American Benefits Council.  (2004, May).  Pensions at the Precipice: The Multiple Threats Facing 
Our Nation's Defined Benefit Pension System.  Retrieved May 28, 2004, from 
http://www.abcstaff.net/documents/definedbenefits_paper.pdf.  14-15. 
98 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  (2004).  2003 Annual Report.  Retrieved March 24, 2004, 
from http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/annrpt/default.htm.  6. 
45 
e. Moral Hazard 
 Employers are able to adjust the amount of benefits their plan offers to 
employees.  Employers commonly increase employee benefits instead of increasing pay.  
Employers prefer benefit increases instead of pay raises because the increase does not 
affect short-term expenditures; instead, the employer is able to defer the cost to some 
future period.  This type of behavior by financially weak companies creates a moral 
hazard, i.e., it encourages benefit increases regardless of plan financial status, enabling 
sponsors of financially unstable plans to increase employee benefits, knowing that the 
PBGC insures all plans against loss due to termination or financial insolvency.   
 This behavior affects not only plan participants but also other employers 
in the system.  Employers with financially healthy plans end up subsidizing the weak 
because all participants pay a flat premium (regardless of plan funding status) to the 
PBGC.  During periods of poor stock market performance, applying pressure on all 
participants, there is an increased likelihood of the financially healthy employers exiting 
the system if premiums are raised.  The system depends on premium payments because 
operations are not financed by tax-dollars; if the financially healthy plans depart the 
system, the future of the PBGC as well as the system will be put at risk.  The challenge 
then, is to determine a systematic way of identifying and preventing employers with 
financially unstable plans from increasing benefits offered until they can improve their 
plan's financial standing.99 
 
F. PBGC INSURANCE PROGRAM CHALLENGES 
1. Not in a Crisis 
On page 1 of PBGC's 2003 Annual Report, Labor Secretary Elaine Chao clearly 
stated that the PBGC "is not in a crisis."  However, she did not avoid the fact that the 
PBGC is facing challenges: "it is clear that the financial integrity of the federal pension 
insurance system is at risk."100  Several weeks prior, PBGC's Executive Director testified 
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before Congress, stating that if the problems facing the pension system were not 
corrected, the taxpayer could ultimately be required to "bailout" the PBGC.101  In early 
2004, Barbara Bovbjerg, Director of the GAO's Education, Workforce, and Income 
Security Issues committee, went on record before Congress stating that "a number of 
factors pose challenges to the long-term prospects of the multiemployer pension plan 
system."102  Each of these officials is acknowledging that the PBGC faces multiple 
challenges. 
2. The Single-Employer Program  
a. Deficit 
The PBGC's single-employer program reported an accumulated deficit for 
the third straight year in 2003, reaching $11.2 billion, an increase from the year previous, 
and more than five time larger than any previous one-year loss in its history.103  This was 
also a significant swing from 2000, when the federal corporation reported an accumulated 
surplus of $9.7 billion.104  The GAO, concerned with the PBGC's financial performance 
and its future, placed the single-employer program in its "high risk" category, a means of 
placing increased federal attention on the program.   
However, the PBGC claims that they are not experiencing a financial 
crisis and believe their assets ($35 billion) will last well into the future (the year 2019).105  
Challenges facing the PBGC are somewhat beyond their control, however.  When an 
underfunded pension plan terminates, it potentially affects three groups: participants may 
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see their benefits reduced, other businesses may see their pension premiums go up, and 
worst case, Congress may call on taxpayers to support the PBGC, and "bailout" the 
pension system.106  The PBGC's assets may be sufficient to cover its current annual 
expenditures (distributions to trusteed participants), but if the economic situation 
worsens, causing additional terminations similar to the size and scope of Bethlehem 
Steel's termination ($3.6 billion, 95,000 participants107); the PBGC may not have 
sufficient assets to cover even current liability payments.  The Bush Administration, as 
well as other agencies within the federal government, have directed a significant amount 
of attention towards the PBGC's single-employer program in order to improve and ensure 
its future.  Without the backing of tax dollars, the PBGC relies on the private DB system 
in part to fund its operations and pay benefits to trusteed plan participants.  As the 
number of terminated plans increases, and as the number of large plans terminating 
continues to increase, it places an ever-increasing financial burden on the PBGC. 
During 2002-2003, the single-employer program saw three of its largest 
terminations to date.  All three were from the steel industry, placing an enormous burden 
on the program - approximately $6.7 billion dollars, accounting for more than 38 percent 
of claims to date (see Table 2).  Since 2000, 334 plans have terminated, creating the 
largest financial draw ($10.7 billion) on the program in a three-year period to date. 108   
This is evidence of the fact that current challenges, however temporary, are an enormous 
strain on the private plan system.  
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Bethlehem Steel 2003 $3,650,276,601 97,015 20.8%
LTV Steel 2002 $1,849,498,808 78,732 10.5%
National Steel 2003 $1,216,107,871 35,404 6.9%  
 
Table 2. Top 3 Firms Presenting Claims (1975-2003) [After Ref. 49] 
 
 When the economy takes a downturn, there has historically been an 
increase in the number of terminations, as one would expect.  The private pension plan 
system and the PBGC have seen similar challenges in the past.  In 1990, for instance, the 
GAO considered the PBGC's single-employer program high-risk due to its financial 
performance, placing it on its high-risk list where it remained a concern until its removal 
in 1995.109  During this same period, the GAO reported that the PBGC's deficit was large 
and growing, threatening its "long-term financial viability."  At the end of fiscal year 
1991, the single-employer program reported a $2.3 billion shortfall, its largest deficit 
since inception, primarily due to two large terminations (Eastern Airlines, $552 million, 
and Pan American Airlines, $841 million).  Of note, in 1992, the PBGC deficit had been 
growing since its inception in 1974.110 
Some have likened the PBGC deficit "crisis" to that of the Savings and 
Loan (S&L) crisis in the 1980s.  As the American Benefits Council points out, there are 
significant differences, however. 111  Individual account holders during the S&L crisis 
had the right to demand their account balances at any time from their financial institution.  
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In the case of the PBGC, a participant is unable to demand the full amount at any time.  
When the threat of financial loss became imminent during the S&L crisis, many 
customers withdrew, or attempted to withdraw their account balances.  This in turn 
caused an increased financial demand on the S&L system, forcing the federal government 
to step in and provide federal funds in order to meet demand.  In the case of the PBGC, 
there will never be a time when all benefits become due at once, because the system is 
designed to distribute retirement benefits over a long period.  True, recipients can opt for 
lump sum distributions, but those plans offering lump sums represent only a small 
percentage of the benefits guaranteed by the PBGC. 
b. Premium Payment and Risk Determination 
As previously mentioned, the Executive Director of the PBGC believes 
there is cause for concern.  In testimony before Congress he stated that a good indicator 
of trouble is the fact that premium income is not increasing from year to year; rather, it 
has been in a decline since 1996 (at the time of his testimony there was not sufficient data 
to determine statistics for 2003) (see Figure 11).112  There was a rise in variable rate 
premiums in 2003, however.  If the trend of decreasing premiums continues, it could lead 
to a situation where the PBGC must raise premium payments.  The PBGC relies on 
invested assets and premium payments in order to pay trusteed participants relying on the 
PBGC for their retirement income.  If the decline in premium income continues, and if 
PBGC liabilities increase further, premium payments ultimately will go up.  The PBGC is 
reluctant to raise premiums because they risk losing program participants.  A growing 
number of employers are already voluntarily terminating their plans and exiting the 
system, offering instead, the more easily managed and less expensive DC plans.  The 
PBGC is understandably reluctant to raise premiums, for fear they may be left with 
significantly fewer participating employers and an increased financial burden.  
Ultimately, if the burden becomes too great, the PBGC will call on the federal 
government (the taxpayer) to ease the burden.   
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Figure 11. PBGC Premium Revenue (1980-2003) Single-Employer Program [From 
Ref. 49] 
 
When premiums rise, those who sponsor healthy plans are penalized for the under 
performance of others (moral hazard).  Instead of taxing all to support the few, the 
challenge is to develop a better method of identifying weaker plans, and forcing 
terminations earlier while sponsors still have the means to support a termination.  Current 
law, which requires taxing a plan that is already underfunded and will most likely 
terminate in the near future, sounds illogical.  Therefore, the challenge facing the PBGC 
is to better determine a means of identifying the plans that are at risk earlier in the life of 
the plans and reduce its deficit without raising premiums – if that is possible. 
2. The Multiemployer Program  
Many of the factors affecting multiemployer plans over the last several years are 
similar to those challenging single-employer plans: historically low interest rates, poor 
stock market performance, and a stagnant economy; a growing number of employers 
choosing to offer DC plans over DB; and the growing life expectancy of Americans 
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resulting in increased pension benefit costs.113  There are however, several challenges to 
multiemployer plans different from those pressuring the single-employer system. 
The PBGC operates the single-employer and multiemployer programs separately, 
each having separate insurance funds, different insurance coverage rules, and different 
participant guarantees.  Generally, employer contributions to multiemployer plans are 
based on a set dollar amount per hour of covered work per active plan participant.114  
Faced with poor market conditions over the last several years, many employers have cut 
back on employment, thereby lowering contributions, which in turn has lowered plan 
funding.  This is expected during an economic downturn, but the system has been further 
challenged with a decrease in the number of active participants, while at the same time 
experiencing an increase in the number of retirees from 1.4 to 2.8 million since 1980.115  
A similar trend is evident in the single-employer program, but the challenge to the 
multiemployer program is more pronounced, because employer contributions are tied to 
active employment numbers.  
As of 2003-year end, the PBGC multiemployer plan system had an accumulated 
deficit of $261 million, its first since 1981, which is nearly five times larger than its 2000 
deficit.116  Further, the program was underfunded by $100 million at the end of 2003.  
These numbers represent a far less daunting financial burden then those facing the single-
employer plan program, but the challenges facing the multiemployer program may prove 
more significant.   
In 1980, there were 2,244 plans, but by 2003, the number had fallen to 1,623, a 
decline of 27 percent.117  The multiemployer program covered 4.7 million active 
participants in 1980, representing about one-fifth of all active benefit plan participants.  
This number has since dropped to 3.3 million, covering only 4.1 percent of the workforce 
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as of 2001 (latest available numbers).118  Further, in the last eleven years there have only 
been five new plans introduced to the system.   
Multiemployer plans are tied to collective bargaining agreements, which means 
the future of the program may depend on the future existence of the labor union.  In 1980, 
19 percent of the national workforce belonged to unions, where today that number is less 
than nine percent.119   
As union membership declines, the number of retirees and plan operating costs 
increase, and the number of multiemployer plans decrease, the future of the 
multiemployer plan program is increasingly challenged. 
The DB pension plan system experienced multiple challenges over the last several 
years.  These challenges included the increased cost of retirees spending longer in 
retirement, employers exiting the DB plan system, the use of an obsolete interest rate for 
pension liability calculations, complex administrative rules, system abuses by financially 
weak participants, and several unusually large plan terminations, were exacerbated by 
interest rates at a 50-year low, equities in the stock market performing poorly, and an 
economic downturn.  Consequently, a considerable strain has been put on the PBGC, 
increasing its combined deficit to $11.49 billion by the end of 2003.  A number of 
proposed reforms have emerged to preserve and prolong the life of the DB plan system. 




V. POLICY SOLUTIONS 
A. ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS 
In July 2003, the Treasury Department released "The Administration's Proposal to 
Improve the Accuracy and Transparency of Pension Information," proposing three 
measures of reform.  These were: (1) to improve the accuracy of the pension liability 
discount rate; (2) to increase the transparency of pension plan information; and (3) to 
strengthen safeguards against pension underfunding.120  The President addressed these 
proposals as follows in his fiscal year 2005 budget: 
Give employers two years of relief from current pension plan contribution 
requirements – now tied to 30-year Treasury bond interest rates – and base 
requirements on more appropriate corporate bond rates. 
After the two-year transition period, base pension funding requirements on 
a "yield curve" (commonly used in corporate finance), which would better 
tie funding requirements to the timing of the payout of retiree benefits. 
Make additional changes to restrict promises of added benefits by severely 
underfunded plans and to provide better information on pension finances 
to workers, retirees and stockholders.121 
1. Improving Pension Discount Rate 
In testimony before Congress, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for 
Economic Policy Mark Warshawsky highlighted the fact that the first step in pension 
reform is to address liability measurement.  Warshawsky conceded that the 30-year 
Treasury rate is no longer accurate and therefore believed it was "imperative" to promptly 
enact its replacement.122  He provided three reasons why an accurate interest rate is vital 
to pension calculations: (1) it fosters accurate determination of contribution payments, 
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enabling sponsors to earmark the correct amount of funds in order to meet minimum 
funding rules and target goals; (2) it enables investors to have a better understanding of 
the amount of future earnings that will be dedicated to plan funding; and (3) it ensures 
participants have the correct financial information regarding the health of their retirement 
plan. 
a.  Liability Calculations Based on Corporate Rates 
Because pensions are not bought and sold on the open market, 
Warshawsky noted, the interest rate used should be aligned with that used on a similar 
financial obligation.123  The Administration argued that the interest rate used in pension 
liability calculations should be modeled after group annuity contract payments rates, 
since these contracts perform much like pensions.  The Bush Administration proposes the 
use of an interest rate which is based on corporate high-quality investment grade bonds 
(AAA/AA).  The use of an interest rate associated with "safe," high-quality bonds will 
ensure interest rate calculations are consistent with market-to-market performance, and 
support the sound investment criteria required.  
b. Unsmoothed Corporate Yield Curve 
The Administration also proposes a change to current funding rules to 
adopt the use of a corporate yield curve instead of a single long-term interest rate for 
pension calculations.  In financial markets, the interest rate earned on an investment or 
paid on a loan typically varies with term lengths; therefore, it is prudent to use the same 
approach when calculating pension liabilities.  The use of an unsmoothed corporate yield 
curve, according to the Treasury Department, will enable employers to use different 
interest rates to calculate benefits and liabilities of participants in different stages of their 
career and life.   
For example, an employer with a predominantly aging workforce does not 
benefit in using a 30-year rate to predict pension contributions, just as an employer with a 
predominantly younger workforce does not profit from using a 5-year rate for all 
calculations.  Warshawsky illustrates this point further by giving a hypothetical example 
of a consumer who goes to a bank to borrow money in order to buy a house.  The 
consumer will expect to pay a higher interest rate for a 30-year mortgage than for a 15-
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year mortgage.124  The Administration's proposal includes the use of interest rates based 
on zero coupon bonds, taken from a corporate yield curve, maturing on the same date as 
pension benefits become due. 
The proposal phases in the use of the yield curve over five years.  The first 
two years employers would use a static corporate rate, while in the third year beginning 
the use of the yield curve, with all plan sponsors using it by the fifth and final year. 
c. Elimination of Smoothing 
Current law permits the use of interest rate "smoothing," allowing 
sponsors to use an interest rate that is based on a corridor above and below the weighted 
average of the interest rate over several plan years.125  Smoothing reduces the volatility 
of liability calculations and aids sponsors in making future contributions more 
predictable.  The Administration believes that smoothing also reduces the accuracy of 
pension calculations by using a weighted average instead of the true interest rate.  
Therefore, the Administration proposes to phase out the use of smoothing over the same 
five-year period as the implementation of the yield curve. 
d. Interest Rate Use – Annuities and Lump Sums 
The Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004 did not change current law 
requiring the use of the obsolete 30-year Treasury rate for lump sum calculations.  Using 
two different interest rates when calculating the present value of a lifetime annuity and a 
lump sum benefit of the same economic value over-inflates the lump sum amount, 
encouraging plan participants to choose lump sums over lifetime annuities (if offered).  
Additionally, the two rates cause a mismatch in plan funding.  Funding rules require the 
use of the temporary corporate rate for contribution calculations while the rules also 
require the use of the 30-year Treasury rate when calculating lump sum distribution 
amounts.  This results in greater than planned expenditures for plan sponsors.  The 
Administration proposes the use of the yield curve to calculate lump sums and plan 
contributions.  Use of a yield curve for lump sum calculations will be phased in over a 
five-year period.126 
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2. Increased Transparency 
The Bush Administration believes that in many cases plan participants do not 
receive sufficient plan financial information.  Additional information is intended to 
protect participants from loss.  By making poor plan performance public earlier in the life 
of the plan, participants will be able to find out that their plan is in trouble before the plan 
is terminated.  Increasing information in the manner described below, the Administration 
hopes, will foster better long-term career and retirement planning.  
a. Current Liability vs. Termination Liability 
The Administration proposes a change to DB plan accounting rules, by 
requiring employers to disclose both termination and current liability in annual financial 
reports.  Termination liability includes all costs used to determine current liability, in 
addition to the costs associated with plan terminations.  Termination liability tends to be 
higher than current liability, which the Administration believes is a more realistic account 
of the plan's financial health.  
b. Public Disclosure of Plan Underfunding 
Current law requires employers to notify the PBGC if plan underfunding 
reaches $50 million or greater.  This notification remains confidential.  The Bush 
Administration proposes that plans this severely underfunded should be required to make 
public additional plan financial information.  Public information would include the assets, 
liabilities, and funding ratios of the underfunded plan, but would not include any 
confidential employer financial information.  This public notification satisfies two 
objectives: (1) it provides plan participants with information that will enable them to 
better plan for their future; and (2) it provides an incentive for employers to devote 
additional assets to their troubled plan. 
c. Duration-Matched Liability Disclosure 
The Bush Administration's proposal includes the requirement for 
employers to disclose annual plan liabilities based on the use of the proposed yield curve 
before the five-year phase-in is completed.  This proposal allows participants and 
investors to have access to more accurate accounting of pension liabilities, which is 
intended to facilitate future planning. 
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3. Strengthen Pension Funding 
a. Restrict Benefit Increases 
In order to prevent employers who sponsor underfunded plans from 
increasing employee benefits, thus placing an increased financial strain on the firm, the 
plan, and the pension system (creating a moral hazard), the Administration proposes to 
restrict benefit increases to healthy plans.  The proposal prevents employers with below 
investment grade credit ratings and a funding ratio of less than 50 percent of termination 
liability from increasing employee benefits.  Plans meeting these criteria would have to 
freeze the plan, preventing additional benefit accruals and prohibiting lump sum 
payments unless the employer contributes cash or is fully able to fund these added 
benefits.   
This proposal stems from plan termination research conducted by the 
PBGC.  Their analysis discovered that in over half of plan terminations, 90 percent of 
companies whose plans were taken over by the PBGC had junk bond credit ratings for a 
ten-year period prior to termination.127  This proposal aims to prevent employers from 
making pension promises they cannot keep.   
 
B. 108TH CONGRESS - LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 
1. Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004 
In the first session of the 108th Congress, Representative Boehner introduced H.R. 
3108, The Pension Funding Equity Act, "To amend the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 and the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to temporarily replace the 
30-year Treasury rate with a rate based on long-term corporate bonds for certain pension 
plan funding requirements and other provisions, and for other purposes."128  Backed by 
the Bush Administration, H.R. 3108 provides extended interest rate relief to corporate 
America by amending current law to use a temporary interest rate, which would replace 
the obsolete 30-year Treasury rate until Congress decides upon a permanent replacement.  
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H.R. 3108 also includes a provision that provides a finite number of companies financial 
relief for several years, known as the "alternative deficit reduction contribution" (also 
known as DRC relief).  H.R. 3108 was signed into law in April 2004, just days before the 
first quarterly pension payment of 2004, allowing employers to pay substantially less in 
premium payments due to the higher rate. 
a. Temporary Interest Rate Fix 
The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 amended pension 
funding rules for plan years beginning after December 31, 2001 and before January 1, 
2004, in order to allow employers to use a higher interest rate for liability calculations.  
This legislation adjusted the permissible range (smoothing effect) used in determining the 
applicable interest rate from 90-l05 percent to 90-120 percent of the 30-year Treasury 
bond rate over the previous four years.129  
H.R. 3108 amends the above provision in several ways.  First, it replaces 
the 30-year Treasury rate with an interest rate based on an index of high-quality corporate 
bond rates, chosen by the Treasury Department.  Additionally, H.R. 3108 amended the 
permissible range for plan years beginning after December 31 2003 and before January 1 
2006.  The permissible range for these years is from 90 to 100 percent.130 
b. Deficit Reduction Contribution Relief 
H.R. 3108 gives a limited number of firms with underfunded plans a two-
year waiver from paying the full deficit reduction contribution (DRC).  The DRC is 
required of firms when plans have not met the minimum funding rules (90 percent of 
current liability) for the previous two years.131  Instead of paying the full DRC amount, 
H.R. 3108 reduces the amount required for commercial passenger airlines, those involved 
with the manufacturing of steel mill products or the processing of iron ore pellets, and a 
limited number of others who were not subject to the penalty in 2000.  This provision 
will reduce the DRC to approximately 80 percent of the required amount, for a two-year 
period.  The congressional intent is to alleviate the fiscal burden brought on by the 
economic downturn from 2000 to 2002.   
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Members of the Bush Administration, including the Secretaries of 
Treasury, Commerce and Labor, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, 
the PBGC, and several members of Congress, were opposed to the DRC relief concept.  
The PBGC predicts that waiving required penalties will place an additional burden on the 
DB system.  PBGC analysis estimates that the temporary waiver will alleviate high-risk 
companies from paying penalties of approximately $40 billion over the two-year period.  
These same high-risk underfunded companies already represent approximately 17 percent 
of the $350 billion in DB system underfunding.  Those opposed to the DRC relief 
concept believe this provision simply pushes the risk of failure into the future.132 
2. National Employee Security Trust Equity Guarantee Act 
In the second session of the 108th Congress, Senator Grassley introduced S. 2424 
the National Employee Security Trust Equity Guarantee Act (NESTEG),  "An original 
bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 to protect the retirement security of American workers by ensuring 
that pension assets are adequately diversified and by providing workers with adequate 
access to, and information about, their pension plans and for other purposes."133  
NESTEG adopted many of the Administration's proposals for DB pension reform, 
including the use of a corporate yield curve for liability and lump sum calculations, 
reducing benefit increases to severely underfunded plans, and an increase in the number 
of companies eligible for DRC relief.   
In May of 2004, at the conclusion of committee markup, the Senate Finance 
Committee reported NESTEG favorably and without amendment.  NESTEG is currently 
awaiting full Senate action.134  
a. Interest Rate 
NESTEG extends use of the temporary rate described in H.R. 3108, a rate 
based an index of high-quality corporate bonds, for an additional two years.  This 
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temporary measure, in line with the Administration's proposal, applies the temporary rate 
to all plans beginning after December 31, 2003 and before December 31, 2006.  The 
temporary rate will be replaced by a corporate yield curve, which will be used in lump 
sum and liability calculations for select plans beginning after December 31, 2006.  The 
provision phases in the use of the yield curve over a five-year period, requiring a 20 
percent adoption rate over that period, completing the phase-in by December 31, 2010.135 
b. DRC Relief 
NESTEG increases the number of plans eligible for DRC relief.  Instead 
of applying to a limited of companies, this provision will apply to all companies that were 
not required to make DRC payments during plan years between December 31, 1999 and 
January 1, 2001.  Plans qualifying will not have to make the DRC payments for plan 
years beginning after December 31, 2003 and before December 31, 2006.136 
c. Restrict Benefit Increases 
Similar to the Administration's proposal, this provision applies to 
companies whose plans have junk bond ratings in any two of the previous five years and 
a funded liability (accrued vested benefits) of less than 50 percent.  If a plan meets these 
two criteria it will be prohibited from benefit increases, it will have to freeze benefit 
accruals, and there will be a restriction on the dollar amount which may be distributed to 
plan participants.137 
d. Maximum Funding Limits 
To better assist plan sponsors, NESTEG includes a provision that 
increases the tax-deductible limit for contributions from 100 percent to 130 percent of the 
plan's current liability, divided by the value of plan assets.138 
e. Reduced PBGC Premiums for Small Employers and New Plans 
In order to make DB pensions more attractive to small employers, 
NESTEG includes a provision reducing the premiums paid to the PBGC for the first five 
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years of the plan.  This provision applies only to small employers (less than 100 
employees), reducing the required premium from a flat $19 per participant to $5.139 
In addition to reducing the size of the flat premium, NESTEG reduces the 
variable-rate premium payment for small employers as well.  Instead of paying the 
required variable-rate premium of $9 per $1000 of unfunded vested benefits, this 
provision reduces the variable-rate premium for small employers (fewer than 25 
employees – different from above), to not more than $5, multiplied by the number of 
employees.140 
NESTEG also includes a provision under this section which applies to all 
new plans, reducing the variable-rate premium for the first six years of the plan's life.  
The provision phases in the variable-rate premium in the second plan year, requiring 
sponsors to pay only 20 percent of the premium (if required), then increasing the 
premium amount by an additional 20 percent for the next four years (reaching 100 
percent by year six).141  
 
C. CORPORATE AMERICA'S RESPONSE TO THE DB REFORM 
PROPOSALS 
1. Overview 
Corporate America has experienced significant financial challenges over the past 
several years, and a large number of DB plans have struggled because of poor asset 
performance, historically low interest rates and a stagnant economy.  With a considerable 
number of plans falling below minimum funding limits within the last three years, 
employers sponsoring DB plans currently seek solutions that are intended to promote 
solvency of their plans and preserve the future of the DB plan system.   
The Bush Administration and Congress have responded with multiple proposals 
to "fix" the DB pension system, some of which were mentioned above.  However, 
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corporate America is not in agreement with some of these policy solutions.  Some even 
believe that the proposed changes will worsen the decline in the DB pension system.142 
Several recent surveys illustrate corporate America's response to the proposals of 
the Bush Administration and the 108th Congress.  With 75 percent of Fortune 500 
companies offering DB pensions, the views of corporate America must be taken into 
consideration.   
2.  Plan Funding Rules 
a. Use of a Corporate Bond Rate 
Many in corporate America support the use of high-quality corporate bond 
rates for pension calculations.  The American Benefits Council believes that the corporate 
rate is a suitable replacement for the obsolete 30-year Treasury rate: "High-quality 
corporate bond rates are known and understood in the market place and are not subject to 
manipulation.  These rates steer the conservative middle course between the rates of 
return actually earned by ongoing plans and the rates earned by the insurers that 
underwrite the annuities of terminating plans."143  This is a commonly held view 
throughout corporate America, with similar opinions voiced by CIEBA, the American 
Academy of Actuaries, Goldman Sachs, and Hewitt Associates.  H.R. 3108 replaces the 
30-year Treasury rate for two years only, not enough time to make a long-term 
difference.  Corporate America supports the change, but seeks a long-term solution. 
H.R. 3108 addresses the interest rate problem for pension calculations, 
with the exception of lump sum distributions.  Lifetime annuity calculations use the 
corporate rate, while lump sum calculations use the obsolete 30-year Treasury rate.  The 
disparity caused by the difference in the two rates is a source of concern, and employers 
within corporate America seek a solution that will enable the use of a single rate for both 
calculations.  Additionally, the two rates create an inequality in plan funding.  
Contribution calculations use the corporate rate (which is currently higher), while lump 
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sum distributions use the 30-year rate (which is lower).  Not only does the difference in 
the two interest rates create an incentive for employees to opt for the lump sum, it also 
creates a funding mismatch within plans.  Corporate America supports a permanent 
fix.144 
b. No Yield Curves 
Probably the single greatest disagreement between industry and 
government stemming from the recent Bush Administration and congressional proposals 
is the use of an unsmoothed corporate yield curve for pension calculations.  Many in 
corporate America believe the use of an unsmoothed yield curve will create additional 
problems for the pension system.  The American Benefits Council believes the proposal 
raises "serious technical and policy questions."145  The CIEBA, takes an even harder 
stance, arguing that "the use of an unsmoothed corporate yield curve for funding 
purposes would potentially double or triple the expected volatility in annual funding, with 
essentially little or not intermediate-term increase in the accuracy of the actual secular 
estimate of the underlying pension obligation.  Potentially, its use would seriously 
undermine other governmental efforts to manage the US economy effectively."146  
Corporate America does not support the proposal for several reasons: (1) it would yet 
again change the funding rules within the system, and increase plan complexity; (2) it 
would remove the smoothing affect, and therefore increase "volatility," reducing an 
employer's ability to predict funding; (3) it would encourage a shift in portfolio design, 
from primarily equities to bonds,  in order to reduce the increased risk created by the use 
of a spot rate; and (4) it would only marginally improve liability accuracy compared to 
the use of a smoothed corporate rate.147   
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The use of an unsmoothed yield curve, according to corporate America, 
would change the way employers approach pension plan funding and cause a significant 
shift in portfolio design.  Plan portfolios today usually include a 60/40 split between 
equities and bonds.  Equities historically provide a greater return, and with the help of 
smoothed rate, employers are able to predict contributions for long periods.  With 
increased risk caused by the use of an unsmoothed yield curve, employers are likely to 
shift to portfolios comprised primarily of bonds in order to reduce risk, and with this 
change come lower returns.  As expected, corporate America is not in favor of the 
implementation of an unsmoothed yield curve. 
c. Max Funding Limit 
 Corporate America believes that complicated funding rules, which 
penalized employers from overfunding their plans, exacerbated the financial difficulties 
experienced during the "perfect storm" of 2000-2002.  Extending the maximum 
deductible limit would solve the funding problems experienced by employers over the 
last several years.  Increasing maximum limits would allow employers to dedicate 
additional assets to pension funds during periods of economic growth, and alleviate 
significant financial pressure during periods of economic difficulty.   
 The Economic Growth Tax Recovery Reconciliation Act of 2002 
temporarily adjusted the maximum funding limit, but according to John Parks of the 
American Academy of Actuaries, this temporary fix did not do enough "to prevent the 
current shortfall in pension funding experienced by many employers."148  Parks 
recommends increasing the limit to 130 percent of current liability (included in NESTEG 
provisions), an amount that would have covered all periods in America's recent history 
with the exception of the Great Depression and the "perfect storm" of 2000-2002.149  
Fortunately for corporate America, the Bush Administration agrees with this view.  
Undersecretary of the Treasury for Domestic Finance Peter Fisher testified before 
Congress that, "Raising the limits on deductible contributions would allow sponsors to 
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build larger surpluses to provide a better cushion for bad times."150  Increasing maximum 
funding limits is one of few instances where corporate America, the Bush Administration, 
and Congress all agree upon the proposed solution. 
3. Accounting Rules 
a. Elimination of Smoothing 
Corporate America is actively seeking solutions to remove the volatility 
from pension funding and liabilities.  Smoothing, to a certain degree, removes some of 
the effects of market-to-market changes.  Both the Bush Administration and Congress 
have introduced proposals that remove smoothing provisions from funding rules, in order 
to improve pension liability accounting.  Corporate America is opposed to these 
proposals.  Christian Weller, an economist from the Economic Policy Institute, suggested 
in testimony before Congress that the elimination of current policy, "could increase 
volatility of the interest rate assumption by more than 20 percent.  Since interest rates 
tend to fall in a recession, eliminating the smoothing provisions will result in sharper 
declines of the underlying interest rate and necessitate larger increases in the required 
contributions."151  In a recent survey conducted by the Committee on Investment of 
Employee Benefit Assets (CIEBA), 45 percent of corporations indicated that they would 
shift assets out of stocks and into bonds and reduce employee benefits if the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) implemented a change that eliminated the use of 
smoothing.152  According to Goldman, Sachs & Co., "This initiative creates greater 
earnings volatility, mismatches the timing of assets and liabilities, and is inconsistent 
with the treatment of corporate bonds."153  In a different survey conducted by Deloitte 
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Consulting LLP a member firm, of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 37 percent of respondents 
reported that one of the primary methods to address the pension crisis is to smooth assets 
over time.154  Since corporate America already believes that current rules do not 
"smooth" current market-to-market effects enough, eliminating the use of smoothing 
provision from current rules would be bad policy. 155 
b. Increased Transparency 
 Congress and the Bush Administration propose to increase plan 
transparency by requiring employers to publish termination liability along with current 
liability figures in annual reports.  This is one proposal that many in corporate America 
support, or at least, do not strongly oppose.  CIEBA reports that employers "are relatively 
unconcerned" about the proposal, indicating that 92 percent of employer respondents 
would not alter plan design if additional transparency rules were implemented.156  
Morgan Stanley believes that increased transparency is one of four major areas of 
improvement, stating, "Realistic and appropriate pension accounting principles provide 
transparency about the financial health and riskiness of each plan to investors, regulators, 
and sponsors."157  Transparency benefits both the plan participant and the investor.  It 
comes as no surprise therefore, that employers are less vocal about increasing 
transparency, when finance experts like Morgan Stanley believe the issue has the ability 
to improve balance sheet reporting, while eliminating inflated return on asset (ROA) 
assumptions.158 
4. Premium Alternatives 
As mentioned previously, one cause of corporate frustration with pension policy 
stems from healthy companies with well-funded plans subsidizing less financially stable 
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employers with weaker plans.  Rising premiums tax healthy corporations in order to 
ensure the continued existence of pension insurance programs.  Solutions to improve the 
system proposed by the Bush Administration and Congress include increasing public 
disclosure of severely underfunded plans and preventing corporations with poor credit 
ratings (junk bond rating) from increasing benefits.  Goldman Sachs supports another 
approach, the use of risk-based premiums.  Instead of the financially healthy and weak 
plans paying the same premiums, the premiums of the companies with good credit ratings 
would be reduced and the required payments for the weak, which have poor credit ratings 
increased.  "Higher quality companies with adequately funded pensions," according to 
Goldman Sachs, "are much less likely to fail and generate liabilities that must be assumed 
by the PBGC."159   
A different solution is to reduce the guaranteed amount provided by the PBGC.  
Reducing the guaranteed amount would push more of the risk onto the employer.  
Employees would be far more concerned with the financial health of their employer's 
plan if they knew that the PBGC did not guarantee the full amount of their accrued 
benefits, and potential new employees would be less likely to seek employment with a 
company that did not provide financially stable plans.  Hewitt Associates supports this 
approach and proposes either a reduction in the guaranteed amount or a reduction in the 
shutdown benefits.160 
The consensus amongst the financially healthy employers is that more of the risk 
of termination needs to shift from the PBGC to plan sponsors themselves.  Until the DB 
pension system becomes more risk-based, employers will continue to take advantage of 
the PBGC and the other premium paying employers in the system.  
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH  
A. SUMMARY 
In 1985, at its peak, the DB pension plan system accounted for 34 percent of all 
assets invested in retirement plans in the US.  In 2002, nearly 20 years later, DB assets 
represented 16.1 percent, less than half of its 1985 share.  During this period, the cost and 
the complexity of sponsoring a DB plan encouraged many employers to shift to the more 
easily managed DC plans.  This thesis provides a focused look at the DB pension plan 
system, its organization, its administration, the challenges it faces, and the proposals for 
reform.  
In the US, traditional pension plans usually refer to DB plans.  DB plans are 
employer provided, and typically offer a retiree a lifetime annuity, with some offering 
lump sum distributions.  Since 1974, when the Employee Retirement Investment Security 
Act (ERISA) was enacted, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) has 
guaranteed plan participants an annualized portion of their retirement benefits up to a 
certain amount.  The PBGC, created in accordance with ERISA, operates and maintains 
two insurance programs that ensure the retirement security of plan participants.  The 
single-employer program includes 29,500 plans, and covers 34.5 million Americans; the 
multiemployer program includes 1,620 plans, and covers 9.7 million active and retired 
workers.   
The PBGC's sole purpose is to ensure that DB plan participants receive some 
portion of promised retirement benefits.  Established as a federal corporation, the PBGC 
does not receive its funding through general tax revenues.  Instead, it finances operations 
through premium payment receipts, investment income, and through assets acquired from 
terminations of single-employer plans.  At the end of 2003, the PBGC had a combined 
accumulated deficit of $11.49 billion, its largest ever, caused by the termination of 
several of its largest claims to date, exposing the corporation to liabilities in excess of 
$9.5 billion in just two years.  The PBGC estimated that the DB system was underfunded  
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by $350 billion at the end of 2003, and that there were a number of plans whose 
termination was classified as "reasonably possible," representing between $83 and $85 
billion of unfunded vested benefits.161   
Poor financial conditions experienced by corporate America in the first two years 
of this century caused substantial plan underfunding.  Faced with interest rates at a 50-
year low, poorly performing equities in the stock market, and a stagnant economy, many 
employers underfunded their DB plans in order to remain a "going concern."  Plan 
funding was further challenged in 2001 when the Treasury Department ceased offering 
30-year Treasury bonds.  As a result, the 30-year Treasury rate fell to a 50-year low in 
2004.  Low interest rates inflate pension liability calculations (which use the interest rate 
in present value calculations).  Already faced with increasing financial challenges during 
the economic downturn, the obsolete 30-year Treasury rate forced employers to 
contribute more assets to pension plans than they would have if a market rate were used.  
This period (2000-2002), which has since been labeled the "perfect storm," 
exacerbated the negative effects of several funding and administrative rules enacted 
during earlier periods of economic expansion.  Maximum funding rules, for example, 
penalize employers from overfunding plans in order to limit tax-deductible contributions.  
Employers were therefore unable to overfund plans during growth periods, which may 
have reduced significantly the number of plans currently underfunded.   
Since the late 1980s, there has been a considerable shift in the qualified retirement 
plan system.  Employers by the hundreds terminated their DB pension plans for more 
easily managed DC plans.  Frustrated with a complex and costly administrative burden, 
employers in the evolving technology and service sectors are opting for DC plans instead 
of DB, even though DB plans, by design, can offer many of the same aspects of DC plans 
(i.e., portability, lump sum distributions).  This is a good indication that there are 
problems with the funding and administration of DB plans.  Absent such difficulties, 
employers would adapt their current DB plans to meet consumer demand, instead of 
completely abandoning them for DC plans. 
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The DB plan system is also faced with an aging workforce.  In 2004, the number 
of active workers roughly equaled the number of inactive, with the ratio of retired to 
active expected to increase in the future.  This trend is significant because employees are 
spending longer in retirement due to longer life spans and earlier retirements.  The 
increasing numbers of retirees who spend longer in retirement create additional pension 
liability, which requires additional plan funding. 
With such challenges facing the DB pension plan system, the federal government 
has been seeking pension policy reform.  With the DB plan system severely underfunded, 
the PBGC under significant financial pressure, and with the Enron debacle triggering an 
air of corporate mistrust, the Bush Administration, Congress and agencies within the 
federal government (Treasury Department/DOL/PBGC) as well as the FASB have all 
proposed reforms to repair and prolong the life of the DB plan system.  Many in 
corporate America are fearful that the proposed changes will increase the complexity and 
expense of operating a DB plan and force additional employers to exit the system.   
Regardless, the Bush Administration and Congress have taken steps intended to 
improve the system.  The Bush Administration proposes to improve the DB plan system 
in three ways: (1) improve the accuracy of the pension liability discount rate, by 
implementing the use of an unsmoothed corporate yield curve; (2) increase the 
transparency of pension plan information, by requiring employers to publish additional 
financial plan information in their financial reports; and (3) strengthen and safeguard the 
DB pension plan system against underfunding, through the prevention of benefit 
increases by severally underfunded plans.162 
The 108th Congress responded to the challenges facing the DB plan system by 
enacting the Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, and is considering the enactment of the 
National Employee Security Trust and Equity Act (NESTEG).  The Pension Funding 
Equity Act introduced the use of a discount rate based on an index of high-quality 
corporate bond rates, in order to better match liability calculations with current market 
performance.  Additionally, the Act provided relief by reducing the deficit reduction 
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contribution (DRC) for a limited number of industries not subject to the DRC in 2000 by 
as much as 80 percent over a two-year period. 
NESTEG (at the time of writing still awaiting a vote in the Senate), incorporated 
many of the Bush Administration proposals, including the use of the unsmoothed 
corporate yield curve, the prevention of benefit increases by underfunded plans, and 
increases in the eligibility of DRC relief to all employers not subject to the DRC in 2000. 
Corporate America's response to the proposals of the Bush Administration and 
Congress is mixed, but for the most part is unfavorable.  Corporate America approves of 
replacing the interest rate with a corporate rate, but is opposed to the use of an 
unsmoothed corporate yield curve.  Smoothing provisions allow companies to reduce the 
volatility of market-to-market changes and facilitate long-term planning because they use 
a weighted average of prior year interest rates, thus minimizing fluctuation.  Adopting a 
corporate yield curve will subject employers to the rise and fall of the market, and will 
therefore be much less predictable.  Many in corporate America predict a significant shift 
in pension portfolios from equities to fixed income investments if the corporate yield 
curve is adopted. 
Corporate America is in favor of several of the proposals which address long-term 
funding.  NESTEG increases the maximum funding limits, enabling employers to fund 
beyond 100 percent of current liabilities, thus allowing them to save for a "rainy day."   
Many financially healthy plan sponsors have become increasingly frustrated with 
financially weak plans that increase benefits without the means of meeting the increased 
commitment.  Current law permits employers to increase benefits at their discretion, and 
with the assumption that the PBGC will back all terminated plans, some employers are 
increasing benefits without the intention of ever being able to carry through with their 
promises.  When plans like these fail, they create an increased burden on the PBGC and 
the other premium paying employers in the system.  NESTEG attempts to enact the Bush 
Administration's proposal to prevent severely underfunded plans from increasing 
benefits, and thus reduce the number of annual terminations. 
Finally, both corporate America and the federal government have introduced 
proposals to alter how insurance premiums are assessed.  Instead of requiring all 
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participants to pay a flat premium regardless of financial health, one proposal 
recommends that the premium rate be adjusted to match a corporation's credit rating.  
Another proposal recommends reducing the amount of benefits guaranteed by the PBGC.  
Reducing this amount will shift some of the risk of termination back to employers, as 
employees would be less likely to work for a firm that is unable to demonstrate its ability 
to fully fund its pension obligations. 
 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Do Nothing? 
Are the financial challenges facing the private DB system cyclical?  Will 
sustained economic growth erase the effects of the "perfect storm" of 2000-2002?  If so, 
is the best solution to do nothing?  After several quarters of economic growth in 2004, the 
worst of the perfect storm appears to be over.  The question then, is whether the 
regulatory bodies should do nothing and simply wait for economic recovery to heal the 
wounds of the last several years.  The conservative answer is no.  The perfect storm took 
its toll on the DB pension system, but the challenges facing the DB system prior to 2000 
remain. 
Complicated and costly DB plans have been encouraging employers to abandon 
their DB plans for more easily managed DC plans for approximately 20 years.  Until 
Congress is able to implement rules that make DB plans as appealing to the consumer as 
DC plans currently are, the DB plan system will continue to experience a decline.  
Advocates are quick to point out that DB plans can be designed to emulate DC 
plans, offering most if not all of the same characteristics.  With this being the case, one 
would expect DB plan sponsors to adjust their plans in order to meet the growing demand 
for plans that offer lump sum distributions, are portable, and possess early vesting 
characteristics.  Unfortunately for the DB plan system, employers are choosing to exit 
rather then redesign their plans, which is a clear indication of the complexities and the 




2. Future Risks 
It seems somewhat naive for new employees to expect their employers to still be 
sending them checks in 50 years.  First of all, today's labor force is being told to expect to 
have multiple careers before they retire.  Second, who can guarantee their company will 
still exist in 30 years?  So why would a new employee sign up for a retirement plan that 
makes promises up to 50 years down the road?  There is one consistent fact in corporate 
America, and that is all companies will eventually fail, but the government will not.  The 
challenge facing the DB plan system is future risk.  Currently the PBGC guarantees to 
pay vested participants a set dollar amount for life.  If this set dollar amount is drastically 
reduced, sponsors will terminate plans, and choose a less risky retirement plan (DC), or, 
employees will demand that their employers do a better job of funding their retirement 
plans.   
Since the government will continue to exist regardless of whether or not 
companies sponsoring DB plans survive or fail, it is in the PBGC's best interest to focus 
reform efforts on ways that will better assign premium payments, and shift funding risk 
to plan sponsors.  The proposal in NESTEG that prevents underfunded plans from 
increasing benefits, is a step in the right direction.  Currently, the DB plan system is not 
risk-based, and until it is, plans will continue to promise more then they are able to 
deliver. 
 
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As Americans become increasingly aware of fiscal reality, and if the current trend 
of employees preferring to provide for their own retirement continues, the future of the 
DB pension plan system is problematic.  What would be the economic implications if the 
$1.6 trillion invested in the DB plan system were invested in individual retirement 
accounts of some kind? 
Corporate America argues that the corporate yield curve would introduce 
increased volatility in the DB plan system and would encourage employers to shift from 
equities to fixed income securities.  What are the long-term economic implications of a 
considerable asset shift from the equities market into fixed income investments?  
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Is it possible for the federal government to amend the law and remove the PBGC's 
single-employer and multiemployer insurance programs, making employers responsible 
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